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INTRODUCTION
On July 19, 1998, Margaretha Sauer died at the Mena Medical
Center following a five and one-half year stay at Rich Mountain [Nurs-
ing and Rehabilitation Center]. She was 93 years old. Mrs. Sauer's
discharge summary revealed that the cause of her death was severe
electrolyte abnormalities, with contributing factors of "Alzheimer's
type, dementia[,]" and protein calorie malnutrition.
Mrs. Sauer's physical condition at time of death was gleaned from
nursing notes. She had lost fifteen pounds in the last month and was
in need of a feeding tube. There were signs of bedsores on her body,
stemming from lying in urine and excrement. She suffered from con-
tractures from Alzheimer's Disease, which involved contraction of her
limbs into her sockets. She also had a urinary infection and had been
experiencing a foul vaginal discharge
... There was evidence presented that she was found at times with
dried feces under her fingernails from scratching herself while lying in
her own excrement. At other times, she was not "gotten up" out of her
bed as she should have been. Often times, Mrs. Sauer's food tray was
found in her room, untouched because there was no staff member at
the nursing home available to feed her. She was not provided with
* Assistant Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School, Atlanta, Georgia. The
Author would like to thank Sara Brenner and Helen de Haven for their thoughtful
suggestions about this Article. The Author would also like to thank all the professors
who gave so generously their time in critiquing this Article at the 2007 Health Law
Scholars Workshop, sponsored by St. Louis University's Center for Health Law Studies
and the American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics. The Author would also like to
thank Cara Rockhill for her diligent research assistance.
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"range of motion" assistance when the facility was short of staff. On
one occasion, her son complained to staff that he had found his
mother at 3:00 p.m., still in her gown, wet with urine, disturbed, and
upset.
Testimony further revealed that at times, there was not enough hot
water with which patients could shower. Mrs. Sauer was often times
found wet without being changed in four hours. She had pressure
sores on her back, lower buttock, and arms on days she was found
sitting in urine and excrement. A former staff member remembered
seeing Mrs. Sauer at one time with a pressure sore the size of a softball,
which was open. Her sores and blisters became infected. She was fre-
quently double-padded, and even triple-padded, rather than single-pad-
ded for her incontinence problems. At times, she had no water pitcher
in her room; nor did she receive a bath for a week or longer, due to
there not being enough staff at the facility. She was described as
"always thirsty" and her nursing notes indicated that she was heard
moaning and crying. At the time she was hospitalized prior to her
death, she had a severe vaginal infection. When she was in the geriat-
ric chair, she was not "let loose" every two hours, as required by law.
Finally, Mrs. Sauer was found to suffer from poor oral hygiene with
caked food and debris in her mouth.
... There was ample testimony and evidence presented to demon-
strate that Mrs. Sauer suffered considerably and was not properly
cared for, that Rich Mountain was short-staffed, and that the appel-
lants tried to cover this up by "false-charting" and by bringing in addi-
tional "employees" on state-inspection days. Mr. Hemingway[,] [a
former regional vice president,] testified that these deficiencies were
due to a shift in corporate philosophy that placed profits over proper
patient care. All of this serves to support the Sauer Estate's case that
the nursing home, under the auspices of the appellants, knew it had
staffing problems and committed negligence as to Mrs. Sauer, because
it was short-staffed due to cutbacks.1
The jury awarded the Sauer estate and family over $78 million,
which was reduced to $26 million by the Arkansas Supreme Court.2
The nursing home appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court
declined to hear the case.3
We know about the Sauer case and the deplorable mistreatment of
Mrs. Sauer only because the facility did not include a pre-dispute bind-
ing arbitration agreement in its admission contract;4 but imagine if it
had. The suit never would have been filed in a public court. It would
1. Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer, 111 S.W.3d 346, 350-54 (Ark. 2003).
2. Id. at 351, 369.
3. Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer, 540 U.S. 1012 (2003).
4. See Adovcat, Inc., 111 S.W.3d 346.
158 [Vol. 31:157
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have been handled privately and confidentially in arbitration. The
chilling description of a helpless elderly woman forced to sit in urine
and excrement for hours, covered in pressure sores, unbathed for days,
moaning and crying, malnourished and always thirsty, would have dis-
appeared from the public consciousness.'
The citizens of Mena, Arkansas would not have learned about the
suffering of their neighbor or the fact that it was caused by a shift in
corporate philosophy that put profits first over patient care-the cause
expounded by the company's own regional vice president.6 The citi-
zens of Mena would have had no opportunity to express their outrage
at neglect so despicable that it almost certainly could have been con-
sidered criminal. The Sauer estate and family would have recovered a
fraction of what the jury awarded, and may even have had their non-
economic damages capped at $250,000 and punitive damages denied
altogether, depending on the particulars of the arbitration provision.7
In short, even though the public would have paid for much of the
"care" given at this facility via the Medicare and Medicaid programs,
the facility would have been able to hide its wrongdoing behind an
arbitration agreement that Mrs. Sauer almost certainly would have had
no real opportunity to contest, and the cost of abusing and neglecting
the elderly would go way down. This is simply unacceptable.
Many scholars have written forceful condemnations of pre-dispute
binding arbitration agreements in consumer contracts in general,8 and
5. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract
Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 764-65 (2002) (expressing concern that arbitration has
resulted in "a removal of important aspects of civic life from the public realm to a
realm in which economic and social power are even more likely to play a significant
role").
6. See Advocat, Inc., 111 S.W.3d at 354.
7. See Bland ex rel. Coker v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 927 So. 2d 252,
255-58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (refusing to strike provisions in arbitration
agreement that would limit discovery for the plaintiff, cap non-economic damages at
$250,000, and prohibit punitive damages, despite the fact that these provisions
conflict with Florida's Nursing Home Resident's Rights Act, F.A. STAT. §§ 400.022-
.023 (2004)); see also 1 JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE §
4:22 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining that the Federal Arbitration Act commands courts to
give effect to the terms of pre-dispute arbitration agreements-including disallowance
of punitive damages). But see Lacey v. Healthcare & Ret. Corp. of Am., 918 So. 2d 333,
334 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (striking caps on non-economic damages and
prohibition of punitive damages because they conflict with Florida's Nursing Home
Resident's Rights Act).
8. See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer
Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1237 (2001); Mark E. Budnitz, The High
Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (2004); Jean
20091
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some have focused on nursing home admission contracts specifically.9
They focus on the failure of the courts to adequately police these agree-
ments for unconscionability,' ° the expansive interpretation of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (FAA) by the U.S. Supreme Court," and the failure
of Congress to amend the FAA.12 While touching on these issues, this
Article charts a different course.
In this Article, I move beyond the deserved and already well-
articulated castigation of the courts and Congress in favor of an
approach that could, if followed, have an almost immediate impact. I
argue that the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
R. Sternlight, In Defense of Mandatory Binding Arbitration (if Imposed on the Company),
8 NEV. L.J. 82 (2007).
9. See Ann E. Krasuski, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Do Not
Belong in Nursing Home Contracts with Residents, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 263
(2004); Katherine Palm, Arbitration Clauses in Nursing Home Admission Agreements:
Framing the Debate, 14 ELDER L.J. 453 (2006).
10. See, e.g., Blake D. Morant, The Salience of Power in the Regulation of Bargains:
Procedural Unconscionability and the Importance of Context, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 925,
927 (2006) ("Those who apply contract rules such as unconscionability often fail to
adequately embrace the normative implications of power in bargaining relationships,
particularly when confronted with the determination of whether a bargain or its terms
are unconscionable.").
11. Stephanie R. Lamb, Pigs Do Fly: A New Test Limiting the Scope of Arbitration
Clauses in South Carolina, 59 S.C. L. REV. 513, 515 (2008) ("Congress did not envision
the FAA sweeping as broadly as it currently does."); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory
Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never
Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 156 (2006) ("Despite concerns
expressed by members of the 1925 Congress that arbitration not be imposed in a 'take-
it-or-leave-it' context, the Supreme Court since the 1980s has created a statute which
permits businesses to do exactly that."); Richard C. Rueben, Process Purity and
Innovation: A Response to Professors Stempel, Cole, and Drahozal, 8 NEV. LJ. 271, 309
(2007) ("[R]ather than enacting band-aid solutions to deal with the wounds caused by
the Supreme Court's improper exploitation of the FAA, Congress should deal with the
underlying problem of mandatory arbitration .... "); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating
Minimum Quality in Mass Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 383, 403-04 (2008) ("Like
other critics, I remain dismayed by the Court's textually myopic contract formalism,
arbitral infatuation, underappreciation of consent issues, and Pollyannaish view of
arbitration, particularly the Court's uncritical view that mass arbitration is freely
chosen and almost irrebuttably presumed to have quality equivalent to
adjudication. . . . The Supreme Court's excessively pro-arbitration jurisprudence
appears to be wrong in its construction of the FAA, wrong about the realities of
coercion and consent in the world of mass standardized contracts, wrong about the
proper allocation of interpretative power between arbitrator and judge, and wrong
about the posited benefits of arbitration.").
12. See, e.g., Budnitz, supra note 8, at 134; Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen,
Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or
Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 99-103 (2004).
160
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Services (HHS or the Secretary) should declare these agreements
unconscionable and prohibit federal funding of nursing homes that
use them. This approach is consistent with the FAA because the FAA
does not protect unconscionable agreements to arbitrate, and it would
invalidate almost all of these agreements in one fell swoop because
94% of nursing homes in the United States are dually certified to par-
ticipate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
13
Binding arbitration agreements in nursing home admission con-
tracts are becoming more and more common. 14 Although the exact
number of nursing homes that use these agreements is unknown, most
of the large nursing home chains incorporate them into their admis-
sion contracts. 15 Pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements in nurs-
ing home admission contracts exploit our most vulnerable senior
citizens at one of the weakest times in their lives. People generally
enter nursing homes because they are too sick or debilitated to take
care of themselves and no one else is willing or able to provide for
them. To make matters worse, this moment often comes with little
time to prepare. They have had a stroke, broken a hip, or are so
demented that they are a danger to themselves. Their husband, wife,
or partner has died and there is no one left to take care of them.
16
It is at this most susceptible moment that many of our nation's
sickest and weakest, and their guilt-ridden families, are presented with
an adhesion contract containing a pre-dispute binding arbitration pro-
vision. 7 Frequently, they are not informed about the arbitration pro-
vision and sign it without realizing they have done so until they file
suit and the nursing home moves to compel arbitration.' 8 If they have
13. CHARLENE HARRINGTON, HELEN CARRILLO & BRANDEE WOLESLAGLE BLANK, UNIV.
OF CAL., SAN FRANCISCO, DEP'T OF SOC. & BEHAVIORAL Sci., NURSING FACILITIES,
STAFFING, RESIDENTS AND FACILITY DEFICIENCIES, 2000 THROUGH 2006, at 17 tbl.5
(2007), available at http://www.pascenter.org/documents/OSCAR2006.pdf.
14. Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2008: Hearing on H.R. 6126 Before
the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter House Hearing] (testimony of Sen. Patrick Leahy),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_061008_2.html.
15. See Krasuski, supra note 9, at 268.
16. Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 101 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996) (citing Donna Ambrogi, Legal Issues in Nursing Home Admissions, 18 LAW MED.
& HEALTH CARE 254, 255, 258 (1990)).
17. Manley v. Personacare, No. 2005-L-174, 2007 WL 210583, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App.
Jan. 26, 2007).
18. Robert Hornstein, The Fiction of Freedom of Contract- Nursing Home Admission
Contract Arbitration Agreements: A Primer on Preserving the Right of Access to Court
Under Florida Law, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 319 (2003) (arguing that the admissions
agreements are adhesion contracts and that the process by which the agreements are
20091
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been told about the arbitration provision during the admission process
they often do not understand what they are signing. Often, staff mem-
bers do not explain it to them.1 9 In any event, they are in no position
to argue. They have to sign the agreement or oftentimes have no where
else to go.
Thus far, opponents of these agreements have made their cases to
the courts with mixed results. Some courts are receptive to challenges
to these agreements while many others are not.2 ° Congress has
recently taken an interest in this issue. Two bills are pending in Con-
gress that would outlaw these agreements. 2 The likelihood of their
passage, however, is uncertain.
There is no reason to wait for Congress to explicitly prohibit these
agreements. The Secretary is given extremely broad authority in the
Medicare22 and Medicaid2 3 Acts to take those actions believed to be
necessary to protect the health and safety of nursing home residents.
For the reasons discussed in this Article, the Secretary's authority
includes the power to prohibit pre-dispute binding arbitration agree-
ments because they are unconscionable.
A declaration by the Secretary that these agreements are uncon-
scionable is warranted for many reasons. The gross disparity in bar-
gaining power, the vulnerability of the population, the emotionally
charged circumstances that surround being admitted to a nursing
home, the significance of the rights being given up, and the type of
harm to which nursing home residents are exposed (serious injury or
death from negligent care or abuse) all justify a finding of unconscio-
nability. The executive branch is also institutionally better suited than
signed are routinely abused, leaving patients and family members unaware of the
existence of an arbitration provision).
19. See, e.g., Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 983, 987-88 (Ala.
2004).
20. See Howell v. NHC Healthcare-Fort Sanders, Inc., 109 S.W.3d 731 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2003). But see Manley v. Personacare, No. 2005-L-174, 2007 WL 210583 (Ohio
Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2007).
21. The Fairness in'Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2009 is currently pending in
both the House and the Senate. H.R. 1237, 111th Cong., available at http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=Hll 1-1237; S.512, 111th Cong., available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=S111-512. The Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2009 is pending before the House, but no comparable bill is currently in the
Senate. H.R. 1020, l11th Cong, available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill+H1 11-1020.
22. See, e.g., Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 96 (1995) (recognizing
the broad authority given to the Secretary in the Medicare program).
23. See, e.g., Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 497
(2002); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981).
162 [Vol. 31:157
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the judiciary to declare these agreements unconscionable. The execu-
tive branch has superior resources to investigate these issues and can
fashion a remedy-blanket prohibition of these agreements-that is
superior to case-by-case adjudication by the courts.
Proposing a rule of law that prohibits binding arbitration agree-
ments requires one to be mindful of the FAA. According to the U.S.
Supreme Court, the FAA established a national policy in favor of arbi-
tration.24 If the Secretary were to prohibit these agreements without a
finding of unconscionability, the FAA would almost certainly preempt
the Secretary's action. This is because the FAA preempts laws that
prohibit binding arbitration unless the binding arbitration agreement
is the product of fraud, duress, or unconscionability. Thus, it is imper-
ative that the Secretary's finding of unconscionability be well-founded.
In addition to protecting nursing home residents, there are signifi-
cant public policy benefits to prohibiting pre-dispute binding arbitra-
tion agreements. The Secretary's declaring these agreements
unconscionable recognizes the unique vulnerability of this population
and is entirely in keeping with the landmark nursing home reforms
passed as part of the Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA).2 5 Disallow-
ing pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements also has the benefit of
keeping this litigation in the public domain-which is critical for the
public to be able to keep themselves informed about what is happening
at their local nursing home.
Some courts and arbitration advocates suggest that nursing home
residents should simply do a better job of bargaining if they do not
want to be bound by agreements to arbitrate. For most people, this is
functionally impossible.26 Most residents are discharged from hospi-
tals to the nursing home and never see the admission agreements until
the day they are sent to the facility.27 They have no reason to expect a
pre-dispute binding arbitration agreement will be a part of their admis-
sion contract. Like most consumers who sign adhesion contracts, they
do not have the power or the resources to argue over the terms.
Even if residents and their families had time to review the agree-
ment post-admission and could afford a lawyer, they are hardly able to
24. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b)(4), 1396r(b)(4) (2000).
26. See Hornstein, supra note 18.
27. See, e.g., Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 983, 988 (Ala.
2004); Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537, 540-41 (Mass. 2007); Manley v. Personacare,
No. 2005-L-174, 2007 WL 210583, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2007); Barbee v.
Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., No. W2007-00517-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL
4615858, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2008).
2009] 163
7
Tripp: A Senior Moment: The Executive Branch Solution to the Problem of
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2009
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
argue over its terms. Residents of nursing homes are frail and elderly
people who are completely dependent on the facility and its employees
for their safety and health. Thus, many residents and their families
would not oppose the arbitration provision because they are fearful of
antagonizing the facility. 28
Other proponents of pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements
insist that nursing homes cannot stay in business when runaway juries
find them liable for millions in damages.29 In making such arguments,
these proponents point to jury verdicts such as the one in Sauer, a
wrongful death action in which punitive damages were awarded.3 °
Rich Mountain, the facility in which Mrs. Sauer resided prior to her
death, was owned by Advocat, Inc. (Advocat), a company based in
Franklin, Tennessee. 31 Advocat is a sophisticated corporate conglom-
erate. At the time of the trial, Advocat operated eighty-six health care
facilities with close to 11,000 beds in Canada and the United States
and was listed on the New York Stock Exchange.32
Did the large punitive damages verdict put Advocat out of busi-
ness? Hardly. According to Advocat's press release announcing its
2008 first quarter earnings, "[r]evenues increased to $71.5 million in
2008 from $54.6 million in 2007, an increase of $16.9 million, or
30.9%."13 Also noted in the press release, Advocat is in the process of
acquiring new facilities in Texas and West Virginia.34 According to
CEO William R. Council, III, "The first quarter of 2008 was another
eventful and productive period for the Company. We are pleased with
our financial performance, which we believe reflects our continued
success in generating operating results at our facilities through a com-
bination of census mix and rate increases. 35
Part I of this Article begins with my central thesis: the Secretary
can and should declare pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements
unconscionable pursuant to the extraordinarily broad authority given
28. Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2008: Hearing on S. 2838 Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (testimony of Alison E.
Hirschel), available at http://aging.senate.gov/events/hr196ah.pdf
29. See, e.g., id. (testimony of Kelley Rice-Schild), available at http://
aging.senate.gov/events/hr196kr.pdf.
30. Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer, 111 S.W.3d 346, 357 (Ark. 2003).
31. Id. at 350-51, 359.
32. Id. at 359.
33. Advocat Inc., Advocat Announces 2008 First Quarter Results (May 7, 2008),
http://www.irinfo.com/avc/html/lq08.html.
34. Id.
35. Id.
[Vol. 31:157
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the Secretary in the Medicare and Medicaid statutes. Part II of this
Article discusses why the courts should defer to the Secretary and
uphold the prohibition of pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements
in nursing home admission contracts. Part III discusses in detail why
the FAA does not preempt the Secretary from taking this action. Part
IV explains how this proposal comports with Congress's efforts to pro-
tect senior citizens in the NHRA, and Part V discusses how nursing
home residents and the public would benefit if the Secretary prohibits
these agreements.
I. THE SECRETARY SHOULD DECLARE PRE-DISPUTE BINDING
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS UNCONSCIONABLE
A. Motor Vehicle Dealers: I Everyone Else: 0
The most obvious way to prohibit pre-dispute binding arbitration
agreements in nursing home admission contracts is for Congress to
amend the FAA. Amending the FAA has proven easier said than done.
Since the FAA was passed in 1925, the Act has been "amended"3 6 only
once, for the protection of automobile dealers.37 The Motor Vehicle
Franchise Contract Arbitration Act, signed into law by President Bush
on November 02, 2002, makes pre-dispute binding arbitration agree-
ments in motor vehicle franchise contracts unenforceable. 38
There is currently a bill pending that would prohibit pre-dispute
binding arbitration agreements in long-term care admission contracts.
The Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act was introduced in the
House of Representatives on February 26, 2009 by Representative
Linda Sanchez (D-CA) and in the Senate by Mel Martinez (R-FL) on
March 3, 2009.39 The Act would make certain pre-dispute binding
arbitration agreements unenforceable.4 ° The Act applies to all pre-dis-
pute binding arbitration agreements entered into during the admission
process, or at any time preceding the dispute giving rise to a claim
36. Carl J. Chiappa & David Stoelting, Tip of the Iceberg? New Law Exempts Car
Dealers from Federal Arbitration Act, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 219, 220 n.2 (2003) (noting that
many refer to the Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Fairness in Arbitration Act as
amending the FAA, and accurately stating that the legislation is actually within the
Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, not the FAA).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2006).
38. Chiappa & Stoelting, supra note 36, at 219.
39. Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2009, H.R. 1237, 111th Cong.,
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=H111-1237; Fairness in
Nursing Home Arbitration Act, S. 512, 1l1th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.
govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=S 111-512.
40. Id.
2009]
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against the nursing home.4' The Act also states that decisions about
the applicability of the Act are to be made by courts, not arbitrators,
and decided using federal law. 42 Although the Fairness in Nursing
Home Arbitration Act has bipartisan support,43 its chance of passage
remains unclear.
The Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act is not the only leg-
islation pending that would make pre-dispute binding arbitration
agreements unenforceable. On February 12, 2009, Representative
Henry Johnson (D-GA) introduced legislation titled the Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2009.44 The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 provides
that "[n]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforcea-
ble if it requires arbitration of ... (1) an employment, consumer, or
franchise dispute; or (2) a dispute arising under any statute intended
to protect civil rights. ''45 Arbitration agreements that result from col-
lective bargaining are still enforceable.46
Although the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 does not expressly
reference pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements in the nursing
home context, the language of the Act is broad enough to cover binding
arbitration agreements used by nursing homes.47
Whether either of these bills will become law is an open question.
It was widely believed that earlier versions of these bills did not have a
chance of passage during the Bush administration. 48 It would cer-
tainly seem that these bills have a much better chance of passage now
that the Obama administration is in office and the Democrats have
made substantial gains in both the House of Representatives and the
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. As of April 17, 2009, Representative Steven LaTourette (R-OH) is co-sponsoring
H.R. 1237 and Senator Mel Martinez is co-sponsoring S. 512.
44. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong, available at http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=H 11-1020.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. The National Citizens' Coalition for Nursing Home Reform (NCCNHR) is a
supporter of the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009. See id. Nursing home residents are
consumers of long term care services, and thus qualify under section 2(b)(1) of the
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, and suits are often brought against nursing homes
pursuant to statutes that protect civil rights, see, e.g., Nursing Home Resident's Rights
Act, FIA. STAT. §§ 400.022-.023 (2004), therefore qualifying under section 2(b)(2).
48. Ohio Employer's Law Blog, http://ohioemploymentlaw.blogspot.com/2007/
08/arbitration-fairness-act-would-ban.html (Aug. 7, 2007); Storm's California
Employment Law, http://calemploymentlaw.blogs.com/clel/2007/08/editorial-the-
a.html (Aug. 10, 2007, 09:14 PST).
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Senate as of the 2008 elections.49 Passage of either of these bills would
be a welcome development. If, however, federal legislation is not
passed, then the only realistic means of addressing this problem is
through administrative action.50
The Secretary should prohibit binding arbitration provisions on
the grounds that they are unconscionable. 5' There are many reasons
why an administrative agency is superior to the courts in deciding that
pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements are unconscionable. The
most obvious reason is that the courts have largely abdicated their role
in policing these agreements. Even if they were actively scrutinizing
these agreements, the litigation model of determining unconscionabil-
ity is inherently ill-suited to the task. An administrative agency has
superior resources to bring to bear in deciding if a particular type of
contractual provision is unconscionable and can provide a remedy-a
blanket prohibition-that is far better than the case-by-case adjudica-
tion offered by the courts.
49. All but one of the bill's forty-three co-sponsors are Democrats. OpenCongress,
U.S. Congress-H.R. 1020: Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, http://
www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h1020/show (last visited Apr. 17, 2009).
50. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) addressed the issue of
binding arbitration provisions in nursing home agreements once. OnJanuary 9, 2003,
Steven A. Pelovitz, Director of the Survey and Certification Group, issued a
memorandum to federal and state agencies outlining CMS's position on the issue of
binding arbitration provisions in nursing home admission agreements. Memorandum
from Steven A. Pelovitz, Dir., Survey & Certification Group, CMS Center for Medicaid
& State Operations, to Survey & Certification Group Reg'l Office Mgmt. (G-5) and
State Survey Agency Dirs. Uan. 9, 2003), [hereinafter Pelovitz Memorandum], available
at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/SurveyCertificationGeninfo/downloads/SCLetterO3-
10.pdf. Because the survey and certification process for nursing homes is so
comprehensive and intricate, CMS frequently sends memoranda to federal and state
agency managers providing them with clarification of regulatory requirements and
guidance on how to evaluate regulatory compliance. Representatives of the nursing
home industry also read and rely on these memoranda. In the Pelovitz Memorandum,
CMS essentially ducked the issue:
Under Medicare, whether to have a binding arbitration agreement is an issue
between the resident and the nursing home. Under Medicaid, we will defer
to State law as to whether or not such binding arbitration agreements are
permitted subject to the concerns we have where Federal regulations may be
implicated.
Id.
51. The Secretary delegated rulemaking power to the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA), see Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegations of
Authority, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,628 (March 29, 1994), which was subsequently renamed
CMS, see Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 66 Fed. Reg. 35,437 (July 5,
2001). I will, however, refer to the Secretary throughout this Article as the entity
empowered with rulemaking power.
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B. The Courts Are Not Seriously Scrutinizing Pre-Dispute Binding
Arbitration Agreements for Unconscionability
The doctrine of unconscionability serves a quality control func-
tion. When parties create contractual relationships that fall below
minimum thresholds of socially acceptable behavior, the doctrine of
unconscionability allows substitution of government regulation for
regulation by private parties. 53
The idea that some agreements are unconscionable and should
not be enforceable as a matter of public policy has ancient roots.54
The doctrine's roots are seen in the Code of Justinian and ancient Jew-
ish law.55 Every jurisdiction in the United States appears to accept the
doctrine.5 6 An ancient pedigree and widespread acceptance, however,
do not guarantee respect. According to Professor Jeffery Stempel, the
doctrine of unconscionability has been ravaged by a plethora of forces,
including an "academic assault" on the doctrine because of its per-
ceived arbitrariness in the litigation context.57 At the same time that
the doctrine of unconscionability was in decline, judicial zeal for arbi-
tration was at its zenith. The convergence of these trends has impacted
how trial and appellate courts have responded to pre-dispute binding
arbitration provisions. According to Professor Stempel,
[t]hese two strands of jurisprudential development-unconsciona-
bility's fall from grace and arbitration's ascendance-combined to pro-
duce a law of arbitrability that was both substantively supportive of
52. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd- Consumers and the
Common Law Tradition, 31 U. Pir. L. REV. 349, 350 (1970) [hereinafter Leff,
Unconscionability and the Crowd].
53. Id. at 352.
54. Jacob Dolinger, Introduction to Unconscionability Around the World: Seven
Perspectives on the Contractual Doctrine, 14 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 435, 436-
37 (1992). But see Shahar Lifshitz, Distress Exploitation Contracts in the Shadow of No
Duty to Rescue, 86 N.C. L. REV. 315, 329 (2008) (describing the doctrine of
unconscionability as "relatively new" in American jurisprudence).
55. Dolinger, supra note 54, at 436-37.
56. Jeffery W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return
of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIo ST.
J. ON Disp. RESOL. 757, 763 (2004) [hereinafter Stempel, Equilibrium].
57. Id. at 813 ("Five intellectual and social developments worked to place the
unconscionability norm out of judicial favor. First is the academic assault on
unconscionability led by Professor Arthur Leff. Second is the reascendancy of a
textualist, formalist version of classical contract interpretation. Third is the rise of the
law and economics movement. Fourth is the upsurge in political and social opposition
to any perceived increase in judicial power and discretion. Fifth is a general turn
against legal regulation and perceived excessive litigation in favor of a more laissez-
faire approach to commercial activity.").
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arbitration and reluctant to reign in arguable excesses of arbitration.
As a result, much of modern arbitration law has possessed a formalist,
wooden, result-oriented quality that has made it the subject of consid-
erable criticism. Although lower courts have always had-at least in
theory-the power to police arbitration agreements on the basis of ordi-
nary contract law-this power was rarely used until recently. Even the
limited unconscionability-based regulation of arbitration agreements
seen during the past five years has arguably been halting and
truncated.5 8
Although it seems clear that "unconscionability principles are
implicated . . . where patients in need of medical care are asked to
waive their rights to a jury trial,"'59 over-burdened courts often seem
unconcerned about the inherent coerciveness in asking someone to
give up their right to trial on the day they enter a nursing home.60
"Many courts continue to give unconscionability concerns the judicial
equivalent of the cold shoulder and are unmoved by arguments that an
arbitration clause lacks minimal fairness."
6 1
This is evident in the nursing home context as courts routinely
ignore or give insufficient legal significance to agreements that reason-
ably could be viewed as unconscionable.6 2 For example, in Hare v.
58. Id. at 764.
59. Michelle M. Mello et al., Policy Experimentation with Administrative
Compensation for Medical Injury: Issues Under State Constitutional Law, 45 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 59, 97 (2008); see Richard Epstein, The Uneasy Marriage of Utilitarian and
Libertarian Thought, 19 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 783, 798 (2000) ("[F]raud or duress
cannot be lightly dismissed in medical contexts, especially since people are forced to
make their most difficult life-and-death choices when ill-health and financial pressures
leave them vulnerable and compromised.").
60. See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the
Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 669, 669-70
(2001).
61. Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 56, at 765; see Stanford v. Castleton Health
Care Ctr., 813 N.E.2d 411, 418 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (finding no undue pressure where
mother with Alzheimer's disease is "yelling and behaving very aggressively" during the
admission process to the nursing home, and where the daughter who is admitting her
is also attending to her own children); see also Morant, supra note 10, at 927 ("Those
who apply contract rules such as unconscionability often fail to adequately embrace
the normative implications of power in bargaining relationships, particularly when
confronted with the determination of whether a bargain or its terms are
unconscionable.").
62. Some courts decide unconscionability issues with little or no analysis. See
Slusser ex rel. Slusser v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 977 So. 2d 662, 663 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2008) (no analysis); Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of Linton ex rel. Graham,
953 So. 2d 574, 579 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (little analysis). Moreover, some courts
refuse to authorize discovery even when the resident did not sign the agreement.
Forest Hill Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. McFarlan, 995 So. 2d 775, 781-85 (Miss. Ct. App.
2009]
13
Tripp: A Senior Moment: The Executive Branch Solution to the Problem of
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2009
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
Beverly Enterprises Alabama, Inc. 63 a circuit court in Alabama had to
decide whether to compel arbitration in a case involving a resident,
Dollar Hair, who was 108 years old at the time he signed two arbitra-
tion agreements. According to one of the plaintiff's pleadings, the
"only purported signature of Dollar Hair in the entire [a]dmissions
packet[] appears on the arbitration provision."64 The plaintiff dis-
puted that Mr. Hair ever signed the agreement and his family denied
that the signature on the arbitration agreement looked like his usual
signature.65 The plaintiff also argued that Mr. Hair was unable to
knowingly waive his right to trial because he was mentally incapaci-
tated at the time he allegedly signed.66 Medical records from Carraway
Methodist Medical Center show that shortly after Mr. Hair purportedly
signed the arbitration agreement he could "provide no history," was
"very difficult to understand," and did "not ambulate or communi-
cate. '67 The plaintiff also claimed that the initials and signatures by
Mr. Hair's children (some or all of whom were over eighty years old)
could not bind Mr. Hair because they were not his actual or apparent
agents. A request for discovery and an evidentiary hearing regarding
the circumstances surrounding the signing of the arbitration agree-
ments were not granted by the court.
The court's entire analysis of the enforceability of the agreement
consists of the following:
The September 22, 2003[] agreement shows it to be signed Dollar Hair
YH DD which the Defendants state to be York Hare, his son, and
DeVelma Dixie, his daughter. The December 22, 2003[] arbitration
agreement was allegedly signed by York Hare IVVW as the designated
representative. IWW is said to be Inez Webb, York Hare's step-
daughter.
2008) (finding, under an intended third-party beneficiary theory, that a competent
resident was obligated to arbitrate her personal injury claims, even though the resident
did not sign the agreement and there was no real or apparent agency between the
signor and the resident, and refusing to allow discovery on the unconscionability
issue). Other times, courts have ignored substantive unconscionability concerns
entirely because they find no procedural unconscionability. See Shotts v. OP Winter
Haven, Inc., 988 So. 2d 639, 641-42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
63. Hare v. Beverly Enters. Ala., Inc., No. CV 05-0849 TMS, 2006 WL 4661418
(Ala. Cir. Ct. June 27, 2006).
64. Plaintiffs Second Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Brief in
Support of Their Motion to Compel Arbitration, Hare, No. CV 05-0849 TMS, 2006 WL
4661418.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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The Plaintiffs deny that they executed either arbitration provision,
that the family members could not legally sign for Dollar Hair[,] and
that the contract is one of adhesion. The Plaintiff states that Dollar
Hair was over 100 years of age and that his son, York Hare[,] who was
in his eighties, had "swimming in his head[."] Dollar Hair was not
only aged but infirm of health[,J and it was argued that neither he nor
his son, York, had the capacity to understand the contract. Dollar Hair
was old and sick.
The Defendants have demonstrated that under the prevailing stan-
dards the contract involves interstate commerce. The cases of Owens v.
Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc. . . . and Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v.
Woodman . . . are controlling, and the Plaintiff is bound by the arbitra-
tion agreement with the Birmingham East Defendants.
Upon Consideration of the voluminous submissions of the par-
ties, the Beverly Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay
Proceedings is denied [because the arbitration agreements were signed
after the Beverly Defendants sold their interest in the facility], and that
portion of the case which happened prior to August 1, 2003[ ] is set for
trial on May 14, 2007. For that portion of the case as to Aurora Cares,
LLC, Birmingham Nursing and Rehabilitation Center East, LLC, their
employees and assigns, their Motion [t]o Compel Arbitration and Stay
Proceedings is granted. Such portion of this case is stayed until April
1, 2007, pending arbitration of the Plaintiffs claims.6"
It is hard to imagine a case where unconscionability concerns are
more obvious than the Hare case. The extraordinary age and infirmity
of Mr. Hair, the age and infirmity of his son, Mr. Hair's irregular signa-
ture, and the disputes about agency all point to a real concern that it is
unconscionable to enforce the arbitration agreements. Yet, Mr. Hair
wasn't allowed discovery and didn't get an evidentiary hearing on the
matter.6 9 The court simply noted Mr. Hair was "old and sick," men-
tioned the age and infirmity of his son, and compelled arbitration
without any meaningful inquiry or unconscionability analysis.
Even when courts do a thorough job of analyzing the circum-
stances surrounding admission to a nursing home and find procedural
unconscionability, state law may still require the court to compel arbi-
tration. An egregious example of this occurred in Manley v. Persona-
care.7 Patricia Manley was sixty-six years old when she entered the
nursing home directly from a hospital.7 1 She had been assaulted just
before she was hospitalized and continued to be frightened by the
68. Hare, No. CV 05-0849 TMS, 2006 WL 4661418.
69. See id.
70. No. 2005-L-174, 2007 WL 210583 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2007).
71. Id. at *3.
2009]
15
Tripp: A Senior Moment: The Executive Branch Solution to the Problem of
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2009
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
assault.72 She "had numerous physical ailments, bouts of confusion,
and a mild cognitive impairment .... ,,73 "[S]he could not remember
what month or year she retired. '74 Although she was deemed compe-
tent by her doctor, she was unable to sign her name within the lines on
the admission agreements, including the binding arbitration agree-
ment.7 5 In some places she signed considerably above the line; in
other places she signed below the line.76 She was alone when she
signed these documents; she had no friends, family, or lawyer present
to assist her in reading or signing the documents.77 She obviously was
in no position to bargain with the nursing home over the terms of the
admission contract.
The court was troubled by the fact that she signed the agreement
contemporaneously with her admission. 78 The court stated:
The fact that a resident is signing an arbitration agreement con-
temporaneously with being admitted into a nursing home is troubling.
By definition, an individual being admitted into a nursing home has a
physical or mental detriment that requires them to need the assistance
of a nursing home. Further, the reality is that, for many individuals,
their admission to a nursing home is the final step in the road of life.
As such, this is an extremely stressful time for elderly persons of
diminished health. In most circumstances, it will be difficult to con-
clude that such an individual has equal bargaining power with a corpo-
ration that, through corporate counsel, drafted the form contract at
issue.79
The court concluded that the agreement was procedurally unconscion-
able.8" However, this did not affect its enforceability because the court
held that the agreement was not substantively unconscionable and,
under Ohio law, courts must find both procedural and substantive
unconscionability before a contractual provision can be considered
unconscionable.8 ' Therefore, the court rejected the challenge to the
agreement and compelled arbitration.8 2
72. Id. It is unclear whether the assault was sexual in nature or whether it was the
reason for her hospitalization. See id.
73. Id. at *4.
74. Id. at *3.
75. Id. at *4.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *5.
78. Id. at *4.
79. Id.
80. Id. at *2.
81. Id. at *7.
82. Id.
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The Owens case illustrates the courts' tendency to resist delving
too deeply into the circumstances surrounding the execution of a pre-
dispute binding arbitration agreement. Although courts have an obli-
gation to closely scrutinize these transactions due to the nature of the
rights being waived, the hesitancy on the part of the courts to do so is
at least understandable, if not defensible, in light of the enormous
caseload with which many courts struggle. The Manley decision illus-
trates a very different problem. Courts that are concerned about these
agreements and do scrutinize them carefully are hamstrung by deci-
sional or statutory law that was established well before anyone could
imagine that elderly people could be forced to give up their rights to a
trial in exchange for admission into a nursing home. Combined, these
cases demonstrate the reason why the judiciary cannot provide a solu-
tion to the problem of pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements in
nursing home admission contracts.
C. Administrative Agencies Are Better Suited than Courts for Deciding
Unconscionability
In contrast to the judiciary, there are decided advantages to an
executive agency determining that pre-dispute binding arbitration
agreements are unconscionable.8 3 The advantages of an administrative
agency determination of unconscionability were forcefully articulated
83. SeeWilliam R. Andersen, Against Chevron-A Modest Proposal, 56 ADMIN. L.
REV. 957, 962 (2004) ("[A] legislative solution has extraordinary advantages over
continued refinement in judicial opinions .... Rulemaking, we regularly teach,
provides broader fact-finding capacity unhindered by rules of evidence and other
limits. It provides more open access and wider input from those affected. It allows
more general and comprehensive solutions as distinguished from piecemeal fixes or
solutions affected by and limited to the peculiar facts of a given case. Rulemaking's
explicit focus on policy, rather than logic and precedent, its prospective operation, and
its relative ease of comprehensive change when a rule needs adjustment, all give
rulemaking significant advantages over adjudication as a tool for changing policy. The
legislative solution proposed here intends to capture exactly those kinds of benefits.");
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable
Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of the Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS.
LJ. 181, 259 (1998) ("Even in the non-insurance atmosphere, the government
(legislatures and executive agencies in addition to courts) is widely regarded as having
the power to void or refuse to enforce contract provisions that are illegal,
unconscionable, or otherwise at odds with public policy."). But see Sandra F. Gavin,
Unconscionability Found: A Look at Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 10
Years after Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 249, 251-52
(2006) (contending that common law courts are well-suited to deciding
unconscionability issues).
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by Professor Arthur Leff almost forty years ago.84 Professor Leff is
perhaps best known for dividing unconscionability into two con-
cepts -procedural unconscionability ("bargaining naughtiness"),
which focuses on the circumstances surrounding the making of the
contract, and substantive unconscionability ("evils in the resulting
contract"), which focuses on the terms of the agreement itself.8 5 Pro-
fessor Leff and other distinguished members of the Academy
debated 6 the doctrine of unconscionability in the aftermath of the
inclusion of section 2-302-the unconscionability provision-in the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)."7 Professor Leff was critical of the
drafting of section 2-302, the cases interpreting it, and the academic
response to it.""
Professor Leffs primary criticism of section 2-302, however, was
that it put the judicial branch of government in charge of determining
unconscionability8 9 He illustrated his point by hypothesizing judicial
unconscionability analysis of cross collateralization clauses. 90 Profes-
sor Leff imagined a series of lawsuits where the seller loses each time-
the cross collateralization agreements are unconscionable-but contin-
ues to modify the clause to make it slightly less onerous (as dictated by
the outcome of the previous lawsuit) and therefore gets to keep cross-
collateralization clauses in his contracts. Even if almost every conceiv-
able version of the cross-collateralization clause is declared uncon-
scionable, the seller can still use it knowing that it will cow those
buyers who lack the financial wherewithal and inclination to engage in
84. Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd, supra note 52, at 357 n.33.
85. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code- the Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967) [hereinafter Leff, Unconscionability and the Code].
86. See generally Leff, Unconscionability and the Code, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485.
87. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2007), which was enacted in 1962 and amended most recently
in 2004, provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose
and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
Id.
88. See generally Leff, Unconscionability and the Code, supra note 85.
89. Id. at 353-54.
90. Id. at 353-56.
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costly and lengthy litigation, and that the seller can simply settle with
other, more aggressive buyers.91
Obviously this approach results in enormous transaction costs
and generates significant uncertainty. Because each lawsuit is decided
on the totality of the circumstances in a single jurisdiction, the out-
come of one case does not portend the outcome of another in another
jurisdiction. Despite all this cost and uncertainty, the litigation
approach does not even necessarily eliminate the offending clause
from use. An exasperated Professor Leff remarked that "[o]ne cannot
think of a more expensive and frustrating course than to seek to regu-
late goods or 'contract' quality through repeated lawsuits against
inventive 'wrongdoers."' 92
Rather than embrace such a "frustrating course," Professor Leff
argued that the legislative or administrative branches of government
would be far more effective at deciding which contractual arrange-
ments are unconscionable. "Wouldn't it be easier and far more effec-
tive, if one finds these cross-collateral clauses or some others, offensive
in consumer transactions just to face one's conclusion and regulate
them out of existence, in a manner no lawyer could conscientiously
avoid? ' 93 Of course it would.
An administrative agency is also institutionally better suited for
this kind of work. In contrast to the courts-which have no investiga-
tive powers, no subject matter expertise, and are under no command
from Congress to protect and care for nursing home residents-the Sec-
retary has all of these attributes and is in an ideal position to evaluate
the unique circumstances surrounding the admission to a nursing
home. The Secretary's agents, and the state survey agencies with
whom the Secretary contracts to oversee nursing home care, are in
91. See Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Lumpkin ex rel. Lumpkin,
No. 2007-CA-00449-COA, 2008 WL 306008, at *5 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2008)
(discussing the fact that facilities continue to use arbitration clauses that have been
previously found to contain unconscionable provisions, such as limitations on
damages and shortened statutes of limitations); Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v.
Barber, 988 So. 2d 910, 922-24 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that the facility was
using some of the same clauses (for example, limiting the facility's total liability to a
maximum of $50,000) that the state supreme court had repeatedly declared
unconscionable); Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd, supra note 52, at 356; see also
Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Casefor Using "Knowing Assent" as
the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE
U. L. REy. 469, 472 (2008).
92. Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd, supra note 52, at 356.
93. Id. at 356-57.
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nursing homes all across the country on a daily basis.94 This type of
close contact with nursing homes gives the Secretary a much deeper
knowledge of the vulnerability associated with being so sick or
infirmed that one has to give up living alone or with family and go into
a nursing home.
While it is likely that there are times when parties are in a posi-
tion to freely bargain over the terms of the admission agreements and
are able to reject the binding arbitration provision without duress,
there is no evidence to suggest that these scenarios predominate. The
anecdotal evidence suggests quite the contrary.95
D. Pre-Dispute Binding Arbitration Agreements in Nursing Home
Admission Contracts Are Unconscionable
Courts have always policed contracts for unfairness.96 Prior to
the adoption of section 2-302, much of the policing was done surrepti-
tiously, often resorting to torturous reading of contract terms and mis-
using such concepts as lack of mutuality and failure of
consideration. 97 One of the great benefits of section 2-302 was sup-
posed to be that it would make what were essentially de facto uncon-
scionability decisions de jure-bringing what was done in the dark out
into the light.98
Unfortunately, by almost all accounts, section 2-302 has disap-
pointed.99 The drafters of the section neither defined unconscionabil-
ity nor provided any analytical framework to determine its
existence.' 00 While some commentators have defended the vagueness
of the concept as a necessary evil of sorts,10 1 others have not been so
94. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Survey, Certification and Enforcement of
Skilled Nursing Facilities and Nursing Facilities, 57 Fed. Reg. 39,278-01 (proposed
Aug. 28, 1992) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 442, 488-89).
95. See Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1014-16
(1992) (finding an arbitration agreement that was not negotiated or properly disclosed
unenforceable in a medical malpractice suit); see also Hornstein, supra note 18
(arguing that the admissions agreements are adhesion contracts and that the process
by which the agreements are signed are routinely abused, leaving patients and family
members unaware of the existence of an arbitration provision).
96. See John A. Spanogle Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L.
REv. 931, 934 (1969).
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 945.
100. Id. at 945-48; Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 56, at 793-94.
101. See M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE LJ. 757, 760
(1969).
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kind. 10 2 Professor Leff quite famously called section 2-302 nothing
more than "an emotionally satisfying incantation" that proved "it is
easy to say nothing with words.'
10 3
Whether it is inherent in the nature of a concept as abstract as
unconscionability or whether it is a function of the decision of the
drafters of section 2-302 to not provide a definition or analytic
approach, the result is that unconscionability today is an undeniably
ephemeral standard that can often lead to disparate outcomes on the
same or similar set of facts.
Unsurprisingly, courts have developed different approaches to
unconscionability. The most common approach is taken from Profes-
sor Leffs critique of section 2-302.104 This approach requires a show-
ing of both procedural 'unconscionability and substantive
unconscionability.10 5 Many courts requiring both procedural and sub-
stantive unconscionability do so on a sliding scale; the more procedur-
ally unconscionable the bargaining process, the less substantively
unconscionable the resulting terms need to be to satisfy the unconscio-
nability test.'0 6 A minority of courts require that either procedural or
substantive unconscionability be present, but not both."0 7
If the Secretary is going to prohibit pre-dispute binding arbitration
agreements on the grounds that they are unconscionable, the Secretary
must, of course, articulate a rational basis for that decision.'0 8 The
Secretary is not, however, wedded to any particular definition of
102. Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 56, at 793-94.
103. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code, supra note 85, at 558-59.
104. See id.; Warkentine, supra note 91, at 481.
105. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code, supra note 85, at 511-12.
106. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Fuzzy Logic and the Sliding Scale Theorem, 53 ALA. L. REV.
421, 432 (2002) ("[A] sliding scale has been used between procedural and substantive
unconscionability, particularly when the abuse in one category-procedural or
(especially) substantive-is pronounced."); Mo Zhang, Contractual Choice of Law in
Contracts of Adhesion and Party Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 123, 153 (2008) ("In
determining whether a contract is unconscionable, courts often employ a sliding scale
analysis with regard to the presence of the procedural and substantive components of
unconscionability-that is, the more significant one is, the less significant the other
need be."); Warkentine, supra note 91, at 481-84.
107. Robyn L. Meadows, Unconscionability as a Contract Policing Device for the Elder
Client: How Useful Is It?, 38 AKRON L. REv. 741, 744 (noting that some courts require
both substantive and procedural unconscionability); Warkentine, supra note 91, at
481-84.
108. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) ("[W]ell-reasoned views of
the agencies implementing a statute 'constitute a body of experience and informal
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."' (quoting
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))).
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unconscionability or any particular jurisdiction's test for unconsciona-
bility. It is impossible to predict what circumstances might necessitate
a finding of unconscionability in the future; therefore, it would be
unwise for the Secretary to adopt a "one size fits all" definition of
unconscionability. As long as the Secretary's decision is reasonable,
reviewing courts should give it due deference and uphold the
determination.' 0 9
The best argument for a blanket determination of unconscionabil-
ity is that these agreements are procedurally unconscionable. Substan-
tive unconscionability is less availing because pre-dispute binding
arbitration provisions vary considerably in nursing home admission
agreements. Therefore, it might be challenging for the Secretary to
make industry-wide evaluations when there is so much variance pre-
sent. Procedural unconscionability makes more sense because,
although the circumstances under which people enter a nursing home
vary in their particulars, there is a great deal of uniformity in nursing
home admissions. People entering a nursing home are overwhelm-
ingly elderly and very ill, they almost always sign the agreements the
day they enter the facility, and the circumstances surrounding the
signing of the admission agreements are similar.
Although most courts require both substantive and procedural
unconscionability before they will consider a contract unconscionable,
there is no logical requirement that it be so.'1 0 Professor Stempel
makes a compelling argument that procedural unconscionability
implicates the consent norm in contract law and therefore even sub-
stantively fair agreements are ill-gotten gains that should not be upheld
if the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement are
egregious." 1
The error in requiring both procedural and substantive uncon-
scionability is evident in Manley v. Personacare,"2 discussed in Part
109. James W. Fox, Jr., Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 61 (2003) ("[Even if we concede that the decision about
substantive unconscionability should lie with the court, the court should still be
expected to rely on democratically based means of determining substantive
unconscionability: statute and administrative regulation. Where the particular term is
made unlawful by the legislature or administrative agency, the court has an obvious
statement of unconscionability to follow.").
110. Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 56, at 795-96; see also Robert A. Hillman,
Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-
302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1981) (rejecting the division between procedural and
substantive unconscionability).
111. Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 56, at 796, 847-48.
112. No. 2005-L-174, 2007 WL 210583 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2007).
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I.B. Patricia Manley was sixty-six years old and was entering a nursing
home directly from a hospital without anyone to assist her in the pro-
cess.1 1 3 Additionally, "[s]he had fears due to a recent assault, had no
legal expertise, had numerous physical problems, had a mild cognitive
impairment, and had bouts of confusion."' 14 Manley signed all of the
admission documents including the arbitration agreement on the day
she was admitted. 1 15 The court noted that
[nione of [her] signatures are entirely on the designated line [for any of
the agreements]. Her signature on the arbitration agreement is entirely
below the designated line. On other documents, her signatures are sig-
nificantly above the designated line. The fact that Patricia Manley had
extreme difficulty signing her name on the day in question suggests
that she did not have the ability to meticulously read the provisions of
the contracts presented to her.116
Despite the fact that Ms. Manley was confused, fearful, cognitively
impaired, had physical problems, and could not even sign the agree-
ments correctly, the Ohio court still compelled arbitration because it
found only procedural unconscionability and no substantive
unconscionability. 117
As previously discussed, a majority of courts would come to the
same conclusion. However, as the Manley case shows, enforcing such
a bargain in the nursing home context could lead to unfair or even
absurd results. Imagine, for example, if Manley was assaulted in the
parking lot of the nursing home (through no fault of the facility) right
before her admittance, or she was in a car accident on her way to the
nursing home, but did not require hospitalization and was still mini-
mally competent for contract-executing purposes. Although she would
be upset, in pain, and fearful, with presumably nowhere else to go, the
court would conclude that it was only procedurally unconscionable to
have her sign away her constitutional right to trial. Because the agree-
ment she signed was not substantively unconscionable in and of itself,
the court would still hold her to her "bargain" and compel arbitration.
As pointed out by Professor Stempel and the vigorous dissent in
the Manley case,11 there is no requirement that unconscionability be
conceived in such a formalistic, stilted manner. Procedural unconscio-
nability is sufficient to sustain a finding of unconscionability because
113. Id. at *5.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *1.
116. Id. at *4.
117. Id. at *4-6.
118. Id. at *8-10.
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it recognizes that there are particular circumstances where an absence
of true consent should be fatal to an agreement.
Deciding whether procedural unconscionability exists generally
requires an evaluation of the "degree of compulsion being exerted,
how much pressure was brought to bear on the less powerful party,
and the process that led to the agreement."' 19 There is no commonly
accepted definition of unconscionability but a variety of sources have
provided factors that may be helpful in its determination. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts list of factors includes: (1) "knowledge of
the stronger party that the weaker party will be unable to receive sub-
stantial benefits from the contract;" and (2) "knowledge of the stronger
party that the weaker party is unable reasonably to protect his interests
by reason of physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or
inability to understand the language of the agreement, or similar
factors. "120
Courts examine whether a party was: (1) "deprived of a meaning-
ful choice as to whether to enter into the contract;" (2) "compelled to
accept the terms of the contract;" (3) whether "there [was] an opportu-
nity for a meaningful negotiation;" (4) whether "there [was] a great
inequality of bargaining power;" (5) "whether one party [was] subject
to deception;" and (6) whether the "party [was] surprised by fine print
or concealed terms."'121 Courts also consider age, absence of explana-
tion of terms, atmosphere of haste, pressure, and one-sided terms in
their procedural unconscionability analysis. 122
Scholars have advanced criteria for evaluating procedural uncon-
scionability in the arbitration arena. 123 These factors include:
119. Candace Zierdt & Ellen Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the
Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 Ky. L.J. 1, 32 (2007).
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981).
121. Svalina v. Split Rock Land & Cattle Co., 816 P.2d 878, 882 (Wyo. 1991).
122. Edith Resnick Warkentine, Article 2 Revisions: An Opportunity to Protect
Consumers and "Merchant/Consumers" Through Default Provisions, 30 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 39, 54-55 (1996) (discussing factors courts utilize in merchant to merchant
cases); see also Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in
the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 456-57 (2002) ("Procedural
unconscionability consists either of infirmities approaching duress, undue influence,
misrepresentation, or of sneaky drafting strategies, such as hiding offensive terms in
fine print, contradictory provisions, or incomprehensible terms. In searching out
procedural unconscionability, courts examine the transaction to ascertain whether
businesses have taken undue advantage of the rational and social factors that hamper
consumers from identifying the meaning of terms contained in the boilerplate.").
123. Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 56, at 849-50.
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Blameless ignorance as to the existence or effect of arbitration pro-
visions, a consideration likely to apply in many cases since arbitra-
tion terms are not salient to most consumers;
Inability to escape from adhesive terms because of their wide-
spread, close-to-uniform use by vendors;
Defective agency, in which an arbitration provision is negotiated by
or adhered to without authorization[;]
The degree to which terms of the transaction require consumers to
waive legal rights;
The competence of the adhering party and the presence of legal
advice;
The value of consideration received in return for adhering to the
contract term at issue.1 24
While these factors can be helpful and many are present in the
nursing home context, as discussed in subsequent sections of this Arti-
cle, the Secretary is certainly not bound by them. If a court is "left
with the overall impression that an arbitration term was unfairly
achieved .... [then] the arbitration clause is inconsistently volitional
and should not be enforced because of the consent norm in contract
law.'
1 25
E. Newly Admitted Nursing Home Residents: Old, Frail, and Getting
Sicker
Any effort to establish the unconscionability of pre-dispute bind-
ing arbitration agreements in nursing home admission contracts must
begin with a discussion of this unique population. There is no doubt
that this population is one of the most vulnerable segments of our
society because of its extremely poor physical or mental health or
because it lacks a sufficient support system.
Not surprisingly, most newly admitted nursing home residents
are older than sixty-five years of age. 126 Of the total population of
newly admitted nursing home residents in 2004, 41% were eighty-five
124. Id. (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
125. Id. at 847-48.
126. See JUDITH KASPER & MOLLY O'MALLEY, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND
THE UNINSURED: CHANGES IN CHARACTERISTICS, NEEDS, AND PAYMENT FOR CARE OF
ELDERLY NURSING HOME RESIDENTS: 1999-2004, at 4, 7, available at http://www.kff.org/
medicaid/upload/7663.pdf. Data for the Kaiser report were obtained from the
National Nursing Home Survey, which is conducted on a recurring basis by the
National Center for Health Statistics. The most recent National Nursing Home Survey
was completed in 2004. The 1999 study consisted of a representative sample of 7383
residents and the 2004 study consisted of a representative sample of 11,939 residents.
See id. at 7.
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or older and almost 85% were seventy-five or older.' 2 7 Most newly
admitted nursing home residents were women (66%) who were wid-
owed (53%) and were admitted to the nursing home directly from a
hospital (62%). 128
Recent studies suggest that although the proportion of the elderly
institutionalized in long-term care facilities is down, the population of
newly admitted nursing home residents is sicker than just five years
ago. 129 According to the 2007 Kaiser Commission report, health qual-
ity indicators have declined considerably for new nursing home
residents since 1999.130 In 2004, 69% of newly admitted residents
had one or more of five serious physical impairments (Chronic
Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder (COPD), stroke, diabetes, heart dis-
ease, hip fracture), compared to 63% in 1999.' More newly admitted
residents in 2004 had suffered strokes or had heart disease than in
1999 (stroke: 22% in 2004, 16% in 1999; heart disease: 39% in 2004,
32% in 1999).132
The increase in mental/cognitive impairments was even more pro-
nounced. In 2004, 34% of newly admitted nursing home residents
were diagnosed with one or more mental or cognitive diagnoses
(dementia, depression, schizophrenia, affective and other serious dis-
orders) 1 33 compared to 27% in 1999.134 Rates of depression were also
significantly higher in 2004 (19% in 2004, 12% in 1999), as were diag-
noses of affective disorder and other serious disorders (11% in 2004
versus 6% in 1999). 1 3 5 The most profound change between 1999 and
2004 occurred in residents who had serious physical and mental diag-
noses. Between 1999 and 2004 the number of residents who had both
physical and mental/cognitive impairments increased 50%.136 In
1999, 16% of newly admitted residents had serious physical and
mental impairments, and in 2004 that figure was 24%.13 7
127. Id. at 8 tbl.1.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 10 tbl.2.
130. See id. (discussing diagnoses among elderly residents).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (describing affective disorders as "bipolar and unipolar affective
disorders"). "Other serious mental disorders includes personality disorders, anxiety
disorders, other psychotic and other serious mental disorders." See id. at 10 n.3.
134. Id. at 10 tbl.2.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
[Vol. 31:157
26
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol31/iss2/1
A SENIOR MOMENT
There is some encouraging news from the National Nursing Home
Survey. The number of elderly institutionalized in nursing homes has
dropped over the last twenty years.'13  Data from the Kaiser report sug-
gest the elderly are in better health overall, and elderly who are not
severely disabled have other alternatives to help them cope with their
health problems without resorting to nursing home care. 139 While this
is certainly good news, it points out the need for regulators to take into
account that newly admitted nursing home residents are in even worse
health than in previous years. In short, the nursing home population
is shrinking, but getting sicker.
When nursing home residents are admitted to a facility they are
usually required to sign all of the necessary agreements, including the
pre-dispute binding arbitration agreement.1 40 It is not uncommon for
the admission packet to be twenty to thirty pages or longer. 14  It is
also not uncommon for the pre-dispute binding arbitration provision
to be buried in the middle or back of the admission packet.' 42 Fre-
quently, residents and their loved ones do not even know that the arbi-
tration agreement exists when they are executing the admission
documents. 143 According to a long-time nursing home advocate:
[Elven if the long term care facility explains the binding arbitra-
tion clause, most consumers will not challenge it. First, nothing about
the long term care admissions process is like a negotiation between
two equal parties. Consumers sign whatever is presented to them as
required paperwork. Second, no resident or family wants to get off on
the wrong foot with a facility that will hold the fragile resident's very
life in its hands. No one wants to be marked a troublemaker before the
resident has even entered the facility, especially about a legal provision
applicants do not expect to ever affect them.' 4 4
Thus, nursing home residents do not have, nor do they expect they
should need, lawyers present at the time of admission.
145
138. Id. at 1.
139. See id. at 1, 20.
140. See Palm, supra note 9, at 454.
141. I have on file hundreds of long-term care admission packets from the state of
North Carolina. The analysis comes from these agreements.
142. House Hearing, supra note 14 (testimony of Kenneth L. Connor), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Connor080610.pdf.
143. See Senate Hearing, supra note 28 (testimony of Alison E. Hirschel), available at
http://aging.senate.gov/events/hr196ah.pdf1; see also Patients Sign Away Right to Sue
Nursing Homes, MSNBC, June 17, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25217455.
144. Senate Hearing, supra note 28 (testimony of Alison E. Hirschel), available at
http://aging.senate.gov/events/hr196ah.pdf.
145. House Hearing, supra note 14 (testimony of Kenneth L. Connor), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Connor080610.pdf.
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Admitting a loved one, or being admitted to a nursing home, is
often an emotionally devastating experience -something even nursing
home industry officials admit.146 The reason it is so upsetting is quite
obvious-nursing home residents and their families realize that for
most of them, they are entering the final phase of their lives and what
time they have left will be spent not in their home or surrounded by
family, but in an institution with all the loss of privacy and personal
control that entails. Family members often feel tremendous guilt
about putting their loved ones in a nursing home and not caring for
them themselves.
1 4 7
F. Nursing Home Residents Give Up Significant Rights When They
Sign Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements
The significance of the rights being given up also bears on the
procedural unconscionability analysis' 48-and the rights at stake are
significant. Pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements strip people of
fundamental rights, such as the right to trial by a jury of their peers in
a public court presided over by a judge whose decision can be
reviewed by appellate courts and scrutinized by the press. Although
the American civil justice system has come under considerable criti-
cism in recent decades, 149 the right to a trial by jury 150 is still a corner-
stone of our democracy and not to be discarded lightly.
The significance of the harm that nursing home residents seek
redress for is also a relevant consideration.15 ' Normally, people are
asked to sign pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements in a commer-
146. Senate Hearing, supra note 28 (testimony of Kelley Rice-Schild), available at
http://aging.senate.gov/events/hr196kr.pdf.
147. Raiteri ex rel. Cox v. NHC Healthcare/Knoxville, Inc., No. E2003-00068-COA-
R9-CV, 2003 WL 23094413, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2003) (describing an
admission process where the husband "was very upset," "distraught," and "was just
absolutely bawling" because he was "upset about his inability to care for his wife and
the necessity for admitting her to a nursing home").
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a (1981) ("The determination
that a contract or term is or is not unconscionable is made in the light of its setting,
purpose and effect."); see also Stempel, Equilibrium, supra n.56, at 850.
149. Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization: The
Coming Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 211, 307-12 & n.510 (2005).
150. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral
Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1381, 1389 (1996)
(explaining that the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a
right to a jury trial for actions at law).
151. See Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd. P'ship, 155 P.3d 16, 20 (Okla. 2006)
(considering a claim of wrongful death in deciding to uphold the district court's
decision not to compel arbitration).
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cial transaction (purchase of a car, home, stock) so the potential harm
they suffer is almost exclusively financial. 152 Not so for nursing home
residents. They have been subject to violence, physical and sexual
abuse, intimidation, neglect, and negligence that results in serious
physical harm and even death.
153
As this discussion indicates, many of the factors considered indic-
ative of procedural unconscionability discussed previously are present
in the nursing home context. Nursing home operators are much more
powerful than the infirm elderly who need their services, and they are
certainly aware that pre-dispute binding arbitration provisions benefit
the facility at the expense of the resident.1 54 Facility operators are also
obviously aware of the physical and mental infirmities of their incom-
ing residents; they know incoming residents do not have access to legal
advice when they sign these agreements on the day they are admitted.
Facility operators understand that the pre-dispute binding arbitration
agreements mean residents are waiving their right to trial even if the
resident is abused, neglected, or is seriously injured because of the
facility's negligence. It also strains credulity to suggest that they do
not know their many infirmities hamper the residents' ability to pro-
tect their self-interests. That these infirmities and the emotionally dif-
ficult circumstance of being institutionalized put an inordinate
amount of pressure on residents to accept whatever the facilities put in
front of them seems almost too obvious to debate. Considering the
gross disparity in bargaining power, the vulnerability of the popula-
tion, the emotionally charged circumstances that surround being
admitted to a nursing home, the significance of the rights being given
up, and the type of harm that nursing home residents are exposed to -
abuse, neglect, serious injury, or death from negligent care-the Secre-
152. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 956 (1999) ("[Arbitration clauses are
ubiquitous in consumer transactions today.").
153. House Hearing, supra note 14 (testimony of Kenneth L. Connor), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Connor080610.pdf; Bradley J.B. Toben &
Mathew C. Cordon, Legislative Stasis: The Failures of Legislation and Legislative
Proposals Permitting the Use of Electronic Monitoring Devices in Nursing Homes, 59
BAYLOR L. REV. 675, 677-78 (2007) (describing the vicious beating and death of an
eighty-one year old nursing home resident allegedly committed by two nursing home
employees and the resulting failure to pass legislation in Arkansas permitting families
to install cameras in their loved ones' nursing home rooms).
154. John R. Gillespie, Jr., The Nuts and Bolts of Nursing Home Arbitration
Agreements (Aug. 22, 2007), http://www.broadandcassel.com/articles/
SFLGGillespie.pdf (describing arbitration as a "legal club" nursing homes can use
against plaintiffs' lawyers).
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tary could easily conclude that pre-dispute binding arbitration agree-
ments are unconscionable. A decision to protect our most vulnerable
senior citizens in this way affirms what Congress,1 5 5 state legisla-
tures, 5 6 courts, 1 5 7 and scholars 158 have recognized: our nation's sick
and infirm elderly are a vulnerable group in need of special protection.
155. Nursing Home Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b)(4), 1396r(b)(4) (2000).
156. Legislation that protects the elderly specifically or that is enacted in part out of
a concern for the protection of the elderly is becoming increasingly more common. A
discussion of elder protection measures passed or being considered by the states can
be found at Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, States Take Aim to Protect the
Elderly (Aug. 6, 2007), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/shn/2007/sn497c.htm.
For example, the state of Georgia passed a consumer protection bill regarding payday
lenders, in part because it was concerned about unconscionable practices of payday
lenders that were exploiting the elderly in 2007. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-1 (2007)
(regulating payday lending because such loans are "having an unreasonable impact
upon the elderly," among others, and describing as unconscionable choice of law and
forum clauses that attempt to avoid Georgia laws protecting the elderly). In 2006, the
state of Colorado passed a home foreclosure protection bill in part because
corporations were targeting the elderly. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1102 (2008)
(regulating home foreclosures to protect the elderly and others from exploitation and
unconscionable practices, and establishing minimum statutory contractual
protections). In 2007, California passed two bills designed to protect the elderly from
fraud, abuse, and unscrupulous conduct in commercial transactions. CAL WELF. &
INST. CODE § 15657.01 (West Supp. 2009) allows, under limited circumstances, for
attachment of defendant's property in claims of financial abuse against an elder or
dependent adult. CAL GOVT CODE § 7480 (West Supp. 2009) allows county adult
protective services and a long-term care ombudsman to obtain financial records of
elders and dependent adults when investigating claims of abuse.
157. Courts have also specifically singled out the elderly for protection. In Currie v.
Three Guys Pizzeria, Inc., 615 N.Y.S.2d 494 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), the court
recognized that a lease might be unconscionable because it was executed by a landlord
who was elderly and infirm and dependent on the tenant for assistance. In Bennett v.
Bailey, 597 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), a Texas court found a contract for
dancing lessons was unconscionable in part because the elderly widow who signed
the agreement was lonely and unable to withstand the defendants' efforts to exploit
her through high pressure sales tactics and false flattery. In Arnold v. United Cos.
Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 859-62 (W. Va. 1998), the West Virginia Supreme
Court found an agreement between a lender and an elderly, unsophisticated consumer
unconscionable because the agreement required the elderly consumer to arbitrate
claims but preserved access to the courts for the lender. In Romano ex rel. Romano v.
Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 62-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), a Florida court
refused to enforce a pre-dispute binding arbitration agreement in a nursing home
admission contract, in part because the resident and his wife were elderly. But see
Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 983, 989 (Ala. 2004) (finding that
the mandatory arbitration agreement covered the claims asserted); Mathews v. Life
Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 177 P.3d 867, 869-70 (Ariz. 2008) (acknowledging that the
remedies available to elderly who are abused by nursing home staff have been
increased, while refusing to allow extra protections to elderly in admission
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II. COURTS SHOULD UPHOLD THE SECRETARY'S PROHIBITION OF
PRE-DISPUTE BINDING ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN NURSING HOME
ADMISSION CONTRACTS No MATTER WHAT LEVEL OF
DEFERENCE THE COURTS APPLY
If the Secretary acts to prohibit binding arbitration, the manner in
which he or she acts will affect the deference the decision receives.
15 9
Courts will generally defer to an administrative agency's interpretation
of a statute the agency administers. The extent of that deference
depends, however, on the manner in which the agency acted. As a
general matter, courts will apply Chevron-style deference when an
agency's interpretation has the force of law 1 60 or when the agency uses
formal processes.' 6 ' Generally, courts will afford less deference, as
agreements); In re Ledet, No. 04-04-00411-CV, 2004 WL 2945699, at *1, 6 (Tex. App.
Dec. 22, 2004) (granting a motion to compel compliance with mandatory arbitration
provision in admission agreement signed by son who did not have power of attorney
over his mother, who suffered from Alzheimer's).
158. Patrick Emery Longan, Middle-Class Lawyering in the Age of Alzheimer's: The
Lawyer's Duties in Representing a Fiduciary, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 901, 904 (2001)
("[E]liderly wards might need special protection"); Diego Rodriguez-Pinz6n & Claudia
Martin, The International Human Rights Status of Elderly Persons, 18 A. U. INT'L L. REV.
916, 862 (2003) ("[Wlhile adequate care is necessary for all, the elderly should be
given special protection because it is more important in their case.").
159. Newton v. FAA, 457 F.3d 1133, 1136 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Different types of
agency pronouncements are entitled to different degrees of deference.").
160. A leading administrative law scholar, Professor Cass Sunstein, described "force
of law" as follows:
The Court has not explained what it means by the "force of law." There
seem to be two possible interpretations. First, an agency decision may have
the "force of law" when and because it receives Chevron deference. On this
view, the "force of law" test is no test at all; it is a circle, not an analytical tool.
All of the relevant work is being done by an inquiry into congressional
intentions, which are typically elicited by an examination of whether the
agency has been given the authority to use certain procedures. Second, an
agency decision may be taken to have the "force of law" when it is binding on
private parties in the sense that those who act in violation of the decision face
immediate sanctions. On this view, Chevron deference is inferred from the
grant of power to make decisions that people violate at their peril. Perhaps
we could supplement this definition by adding that a decision has the "force
of law" if the agency is legally bound by it as well. This interpretation has the
advantage of avoiding any circularity, and it is for that reason the most
plausible reading of the Court's approach in Mead.
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 222 (2006) (footnotes
omitted).
161. Id. at 247-48 ("If the agency action has the force of law, Chevron applies, and
agency decisions that result from formal procedures are taken to have the force of
law."); see also Daniel J. Gifford, The Emerging Outlines of a Revised Chevron Doctrine:
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noted in the Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 162 line of cases, when agencies act
more informally or when their acts do not have the force of law. 163
Either way, courts should uphold the Secretary's decision to prohibit
pre-dispute binding arbitration in nursing home admission contracts.
Deciphering when agency action warrants Chevron deference, the
so-called "Chevron Step Zero" question, is easy on the margins (regula-
tions that clearly require Chevron deference) but can be quite difficult
in the main. Should the Secretary promulgate a regulation prohibiting
pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements in long-term care admis-
sion contracts, Chevron deference would apply, and the regulation
would be valid so long as Congress has not "directly spoken to the
precise question at issue" and the regulation is a permissible construc-
tion of the statute. 164 The Medicare and Medicaid statutes say nothing
about pre-dispute binding arbitration clauses, and therefore Congress
has not addressed the issue.' 65 The next question is whether Congress
has expressly or impliedly delegated power to the agency to fill gaps in
the statute. 166 Agency rules made pursuant to an express grant of
authority are to be upheld unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. 167 If the agency acts pursuant to an
implied grant of authority, courts will uphold the decision so long as
the Secretary's construction of the statute is reasonable.
The Secretary would most likely draw this grant of authority from
the provisions in the Medicare statute that require "skilled nursing
facilit[ies] . . .meet such other requirements relating to the health,
Congressional Intent, Judicial Judgment, and Administrative Autonomy, 59 ADMIN. L. REv.
783, 808 (2007) ("Rather, Sunstein would have the courts defer to agency
interpretations under the Chevron rubric whenever they carry the force of law-
understood in the Austinian sense-or are the result of notice-and-comment or trial-
type procedures.").
162. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
163. Sunstein, supra note 160, at 225-26 ("By contrast, informal processes-
certainly of the sort that result in thousands of classifications per year-are unlikely to
promote values of participation and deliberation. On this view, Mead puts agencies to
a salutary choice; it essentially says, 'Pay me now or pay me later.' Under Mead,
agencies may proceed expeditiously and informally, in which case they can invoke
Skidmore but not Chevron, or they may act more formally, in which case Chevron
applies." (emphasis added)).
164. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
165. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395iii, 1396-1396w-2 (2007).
166. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
167. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984); Schweiker v.
Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-26
(1977); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 235-37 (1936).
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safety, and well-being of residents or relating to the physical facilities
thereof as the Secretary may find necessary" and the Medicaid statute
that requires nursing homes to abide by any "requirements relating to
the health and safety of residents . . .as the Secretary may find
necessary."168
These provisions are unmistakably express grants of power to the
Secretary. Congress gave the Secretary extremely broad power to do
anything the Secretary feels necessary to promote or protect the health,
safety, and well-being of nursing home residents.1 69 The fact that it is
such a broad grant of power does not make it any less express. It sim-
ply demonstrates that Congress recognized that the agency administer-
ing this statute is in the best position to protect this uniquely
vulnerable population. Therefore, if the Secretary should find pre-dis-
pute binding arbitration agreements unconscionable because they
"relate to" the health, safety (and well-being in the case of Medicare) of
residents, a reviewing court could only invalidate the regulation if it
were arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
How does prohibiting pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements
"relate to" the "health, safety and well-being" of residents? The keys are
staffing and incentives. Good care requires significant numbers of
high quality staff.' 70 Significant numbers of high quality staff are
expensive. Nursing homes facing the threat of substantial jury verdicts
for poor care have an incentive to maintain staffing levels and quality;
nursing homes that have eliminated the threat of substantial jury ver-
dicts through pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements have an
incentive to cut the number and quality of staff.' 7 ' Thus, the Secretary
could reasonably conclude that nursing homes that have limited their
liability for poor care through pre-dispute arbitration agreements will
168. The Medicare statute is located at 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(d)(4)(B), and the
Medicaid statute is at id. § 1396r(d)(4)(B). The Secretary has yet to utilize these
provisions.
169. The Supreme Court has noted Congress's extremely broad delegation of
regulatory power to the Secretary in the Medicaid statute on numerous occasions. See
Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 497 (2002); Schweiker,
453 U.S. at 43; Batterton, 432 U.S. at 425; see also Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp.,
514 U.S. 87, 96 (1995) (finding Congress delegated broad regulatory power to the
Secretary in the Medicare statute).
170. CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., SNAPSHOT-CALIFORNIA'S FRAGILE NURSING HOME
INDUSTRY (2005), available at http://www.chcf.org/documents/hospitals/
FragileNursingHomelndustrySnapshot2005.pdf; Charles Duhigg, At Many Homes,
More Profit and Less Nursing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at 6.
171. Senate Hearing, supra note 28 (testimony of Alison E. Hirschel), available at
http://aging.senate.gov/events/hr196ah.pdf; Duhigg, supra note 170.
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respond by cutting staff, which will have an adverse effect on nursing
home residents.
There is empirical evidence supporting the cause and effect rela-
tionship between limiting financial liability and profit-maximizing
behavior that takes the form of staffing cuts. A study by the Service
Employees International Union and a The New York Times expose
showed that when private equity firms bought nursing home chains
they immediately cut staff-in numerous cases below state-law man-
dated minimums. 172 Not surprisingly, quality of care declined in
many of the nursing homes that experienced staff cuts.' 73 This is
what happened at Habana Health Care Center:
Habana Health Care Center, a 150-bed nursing home in Tampa,
Fla., was struggling when a group of large private investment firms
purchased it and 48 other nursing homes in 2002. The facility's man-
agers quickly cut costs. Within months, the number of clinical regis-
tered nurses at the home was half what it had been a year earlier,
records collected by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
indicate. Budgets for nursing supplies, resident activities and other ser-
vices also fell, according to Florida's Agency for Health Care Adminis-
tration. The investors and operators were soon earning millions of
dollars a year from their 49 homes. Residents fared less well. Over
three years, 15 at Habana died from what their families contend was
negligent care in lawsuits filed in state court. Regulators repeatedly
warned the home that staff levels were below mandatory minimums.
When regulators visited, they found malfunctioning fire doors,
unhygienic kitchens and a resident using a leg brace that was broken.
"They've created a hellhole," said Vivian Hewitt, who sued Habana in
2004 when her mother died after a large bedsore became infected by
feces. 174
Why would nursing home operators cut staff so precipitously
when it was obvious that the cuts were hurting residents? They did it
because they knew they had virtually eliminated their liability. The
owners of the facility known as the Habana Health Care Center
"spread [ownership and control] of [the facility] among 15 companies
and five layers of firms," making it virtually impossible for plaintiffs'
lawyers and regulators to ferret out which entity was responsible for
negligent care at Habana. 7 - Hewitt's attorney wasted three years and
$30,000 attempting to ascertain which corporate entity was responsi-
172. Duhigg, supra note 170.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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ble for causing Hewitt's mother to die from a feces-infected pressure
ulcer. 17 6
The previously mentioned Times article provides evidence of simi-
larly poor conditions at other such nursing homes:
Habana is one of thousands of nursing homes across the nation
that large Wall Street investment companies have bought or agreed to
acquire in recent years.
Those investors include prominent private equity firms like
Warburg Pincus and the Carlyle Group, better known for buying com-
panies like Dunkin' Donuts.
As such investors have acquired nursing homes, they have often
reduced costs, increased profits and quickly resold facilities for signifi-
cant gains.
But by many regulatory benchmarks, residents at those nursing
homes are worse off, on average, than they were under previous own-
ers, according to an analysis by The New York Times of data collected
by government agencies from 2000 to 2006.
The Times analysis shows that, as at Habana, managers at many
other nursing homes acquired by large private investors have cut
expenses and staff, sometimes below minimum legal requirements.
Regulators say residents at these homes have suffered. At facilities
owned by private investment firms, residents on average have fared
more poorly than occupants of other homes in common problems like
depression, loss of mobility and loss of ability to dress and bathe them-
selves, according to data collected by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services.'
77
Thus, what happened at Habana is not an isolated event. When
private equity groups limit their liability through byzantine corporate
structuring, "[t]he first thing owners do is lay off nurses and other
staff that are essential to keeping patients safe."'1 78 This is a profitable
strategy. Formation Properties, the private equity firm that purchased
Habana from Beverly Enterprises, Inc., "sold Habana and 185 other
facilities to General Electric for $1.4 billion."17' According to well-
known nursing home industry analyst Steve Monroe, "Formation's and
its co-investors' gains from that sale were more than $500 million in
just four years. ' ' 8°
While the act of limiting liability through arbitration is obviously
not identical to making a company judgment-proof through corporate
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting Professor Charlene Harrington).
179. Id.
180. Id.
20091
35
Tripp: A Senior Moment: The Executive Branch Solution to the Problem of
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2009
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:157
manipulation, the same principle underlies both actions; it is rational
for profit-maximizing actors in human capital-intensive firms like nurs-
ing homes to boost the bottom line by cutting staff when their liability
for negligence is limited.18 ' The Secretary could reasonably conclude
that prohibiting pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements "relates to"
the "health, safety and well-being of residents" because such a prohibi-
tion keeps pressure on nursing home operators to provide quality care
through the threat of full civil liability for the failure to do so. There-
fore, such a regulation would almost certainly withstand judicial scru-
tiny under Chevron.'82
The Secretary could also issue a survey and certification letter
changing his or her position from "neutral," as it was in 2003,183 to
prohibiting pre-dispute binding arbitration provisions. Whether such
a letter would be entitled to Chevron deference is unclear. 18 4 The U.S.
Supreme Court's guidance on when Chevron deference is due is not a
model of clarity.' 85 While it is clear that regulations promulgated
through notice and comment rule-making are entitled to Chevron def-
erence, it is unclear how less formal agency actions will fare.
Survey and certification letters provide guidance to state survey
agencies on program requirements. They represent the considered
181. The problems of corporate manipulation and judgment-proof nursing home
operators identified in the article from The New York Times were the subject of several
Congressional hearings after the publication of the Times expose in September, 2007.
Nursing Home Transparency and Improvement: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on
Aging, 110th Cong. 398 (2007).
182. Even if this regulation were evaluated using a reasonableness standard it is very
likely that it would be upheld since all it has to do is "relate to" the health and safety of
nursing home residents. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(d)(4)(B), 1396r(d)(4)(B) (2000).
183. Pelovitz Memorandum, supra note 50.
184. A brief discussion of judicial deference to the agency action contemplated by
this Article is necessary. However, an in-depth critique of Chevron is beyond the scope
of this Article and hardly necessary given the exhaustive scholarly treatment the
doctrine has received.
185. See, e.g., Ann Graham, Searching For Chevron in Muddy Watters: The Roberts
Court and Judicial Review of Agency Regulations, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 229, 271 (2008)
("[Cllassic Chevron analysis is dead."); Linda Jellum, Chevron's Demise: A Survey of
Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 781 (2007) ("Far from the
simple, two-step test many originally envisioned, Chevron has been transformed into a
three-step test that no one, not even the Justices of the Supreme Court, completely
understands."); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833, 848 (2001) (finding 14 major unanswered questions raised by Chevron, and
pointing out that Chevron and its progeny have generated substantial confusion about
when it should apply); Sunstein, supra note 160, at 193 (arguing that the Court's
Chevron progeny has introduced too much complexity in the analysis and uncertainty
for lower courts "without promoting important countervailing values").
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judgment of the agency and they apply nation-wide. Supreme Court
precedent and lower court cases suggest that, while perhaps not
according Chevron deference, a reviewing court would accord the Sec-
retary's decision "respectful consideration" or deference consistent
with the Court's pre-Chevron model of judicial deference to agency
decision-making under Skidmore.18 6 In practical terms, the type of def-
erence accorded to the Secretary will not matter because "Chevron and
Skidmore are not radically different in practice; in most cases, either
approach will lead to the same result.
187
IlI. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT WOULD NOT PREEMPT THE
SECRETARY'S PROHIBITION OF PRE-DISPUTE BINDING ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS IN NURSING HOME ADMISSION CONTRACTS
The FAA, enacted in 1925, provides that a
written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
186. Numerous cases suggest that less formal agency actions receive less than
Chevron deference. See, e.g., Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S.
473, 497 (2002) (giving "respectful consideration" to agency letters to state Medicaid
directors expressing the Secretary's interpretation that the Medicaid Act permitted an
"income-first" methodology for determining Medicaid eligibility (citing United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001))); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S.
504, 512 (1994); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43-44 (1981); S.D. ex rel.
Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 590 n.6 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Although not entitled to
Chevron deference, relatively informal CMS interpretations of the Medicaid Act, such
as the State Medicaid Manual, are entitled to respectful consideration in light of the
agency's significant expertise, the technical complexity of the Medicaid program, and
the exceptionally broad authority conferred upon the Secretary under the Act.");
Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Wilson-Coker, 311 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2002); Landers v.
Leavitt, No. 3:04-cv-1988 UCH), 2006 WL 2560297, at *6 (D. Conn. Sept. 1, 2006).
But see Your Home Visiting Nurse Servs., Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449, 452-53 (1999)
(affording Chevron deference to Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual); Smiley v.
Citibank, N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-43 (1996) (giving Chevron deference to a proposed
agency rule adopted after the initiation of litigation). The pre-Chevron test, articulated
in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), was substantially similar to the
"respectful consideration" test currently used for less formal agency actions:
[R]ulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator . . .while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment... will depend
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
Id. at 140.
187. Sunstein, supra note 160, at 229.
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thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.1.88
The FAA was enacted at a time when courts were hostile to
merchants' attempts to privately resolve their own disputes using
industry norms.189 Courts regularly invalidated pre-dispute binding
arbitration agreements negotiated by commercial entities with approxi-
mate bargaining power who actually desired a private forum for dis-
pute resolutions and subject-matter expert arbitrators rather than
being forced to go to court in front of lay judges and juries.' 90 The
courts' refusal to honor these agreements was simply a function of
judicial animus to them.' 9 ' The FAA was passed to rectify this
problem. 192
To the consternation of many critics,' 93 the U.S. Supreme Court
has interpreted the FAA much more broadly than its legislative history
might suggest. 194 The Court's jurisprudence on arbitration and the
FAA has evolved considerably since 1925.195 It initially appeared that
188. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2007).
189. See Gavin, supra note 83, at 253.
190. See id. at 251-52.
191. Carroll S. Neesemann, Montana Court Continues Its Hostility to Mandatory
Arbitration, 58 Disp. RESOL. J. 22, 25 (2003) ("It was a garden-variety brokerage
contract, containing a garden-variety arbitration clause. Thus, the court's animus
seems to have been directed at arbitration in general.").
192. Kenyon D. Harbison, Are Contingent-Fee Attorneys Deterred? How Courts Can
More Effectively Police Adhesive Arbitration Agreements, 7 APPALACHIAN J.L. 207, 209
(2008); Stanley A. Leasure, Arbitration of Nursing Home Claims: Oklahoma Goes Its
Own Way, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 737, 748 (2007); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate
Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 637, 647 (1996); Recent Proposed Legislation, Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S.
1782, 110th Cong. (2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 2262, 2262-63 (2008).
193. See Lamb, supra note 11, at 515; Moses, supra note 11, at 156; Rueben, supra
note 11, at 309; Stempel, supra note 11, at 403-04.
194. Harbison, supra note 192, at 210 ("As a general rule, the Court has broadly and
consistently construed the FAA .... "); Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 56, at 771
("Viewed as a whole and in light of its limited but clear legislative history and political
background, it is clear that the [FAA] was designed largely to ensure that written
arbitration clauses contained in commercial contracts between merchants were
enforced."); see also Sternlight, supra note 192, at 664 ("The Supreme Court
dramatically increased the scope of the FAA during this third period by expounding
the dual myths that the FAA applies to actions brought in state court and that the FAA
prohibits states from enacting legislation hostile to arbitration.").
195. Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 63-77 (1997) (discussing the evolution of
arbitration under the FAA); Kenneth F. Dunham, Binding Arbitration and Specific
Performance Under the FAA: Will This Marriage of Convenience Survive?, 3 J. Am. ARB.
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the Court would give the FAA a narrow interpretation, 196 and that the
FAA was a procedural law that would only apply in federal courts.
197
In the early cases, beginning in 1953 with Wilko v. Swan, the Court
was concerned with whether the parties actually consented to arbitra-
tion of their claims.' 98 In the late 1960s and 1970s, the Court shifted
from focusing on whether the parties had actually agreed to arbitrate
the claims at issue to focusing on individual interests and the extent to
which arbitration advanced certain social policies.' 99 In 1983, the
Court decided the first case, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mer-
cury Construction Corp., which reflected the beginnings of what would
become a virtually unbridled zeal for pre-dispute binding arbitration
clauses. 200 In Moses H. Cone-a case involving a construction contract
dispute-the Court announced that the FAA embodied a "federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration" and "any doubts concerning the scope of arbi-
trable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. "201
The Court further expanded the reach of the FAA in Southland
Corp. v. Keating20 2 and Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson.213 In
Keating, the Court held for the first time that the FAA applied in state
courts and that state laws excluding certain types of claims from arbi-
tration were preempted by the FAA. 214 In Allied-Bruce Terminix, the
Court struck down an Alabama statute prohibiting arbitration and
read the phrase "evidencing a transaction involving commerce" to give
the FAA reach that is coextensive with Congress's power to regulate
under the Commerce Clause.205 According to one commentator:
187, 212 (2004) ("Thus, case law has evolved from treating arbitration agreements as
totally unenforceable in the cases decided prior to the FAA, to completely enforceable
in most cases decided since the mid-1980s."); Braine F. Pagel, Jr., Sounding the Death
Knell of Forced Consumer Arbitration, 79 Wis. LAw. 13, 13 (2006) ("Over time, the FAA
evolved from what arguably was intended as a procedural statute into a statute that
grants a substantive right.").
196. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (refusing to compel arbitration of
a claim for damages under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 because the intent of
Congress in enacting the Securities Act was better served by invalidating the
arbitration agreement).
197. Sternlight, supra note 192, at 647.
198. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 200-05 (1956); Wilko, 346
U.S. at 435-38.
199. Sternlight, supra note 192, at 647.
200. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
201. Id. at 24-25.
202. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
203. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
204. Keating, 465 U.S. at 16.
205. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 273.
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[Als a result of judicial construction, the [FAA] reaches much further
and imposes itself on a far greater proportion of our citizens than was
ever envisioned in 1925. The FAA as interpreted affects statutory
rights, consumer rights, and employee rights, as well as state police
powers to protect those rights. Today's statute-which has been con-
strued to preempt state law, eliminate the requirement of consent to
arbitration, permit arbitration of statutory rights, and remove the jury
trial right from citizens without their knowledge or consent-is a stat-
ute that would not likely have commanded a single vote in the 1925
Congress.2 °6
Withering criticism notwithstanding, the FAA still applies to nurs-
ing home arbitration agreements because they affect interstate com-
merce, 20 7 so we must analyze whether the FAA would preempt the
Secretary from prohibiting pre-dispute binding arbitration provisions
on the grounds that they are unconscionable.
The Court has never been reluctant to find that the FAA preempts
state laws that prohibit or regulate pre-dispute binding arbitration
agreements. 20 8 These cases, while establishing the phenomenal power
and reach of the FAA, are inapposite because they do not involve fed-
eral action limiting arbitration, and they do not consider the issue of
unconscionability.
206. Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 99, 99-100
(2006).
207. Because nursing homes receive out-of-state payments through the Medicare
program and supplies from out of state, almost every court that has addressed the
issue has decided that the FAA applies to nursing home arbitration agreements. See
Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 983 (Ala. 2004); McGuffey Health
& Rehab. Ctr. v. Gibson ex rel. Jackson, 864 So. 2d 1061 (Ala. 2003); Vicksburg
Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507 (Miss. 2005); In re Nexion Health at
Humble, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 67 (Tex. 2005). But see Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd.
P'ship, 155 P.3d 16 (Okla. 2006).
208. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 314 (2002) ("[T]he [FAA]
applies even to state-law claims in state court and pre-empts all contrary state
statutes."); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (preempting
state law notice statute that required conspicuous notice of arbitration agreement on
first page of contract); Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 281 (preempting Alabama
statute that prohibited enforcement of all pre-dispute arbitration agreements); Volt
Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 472 (1989)
("[Tihe FAA therefore pre-empts application of state laws which render arbitration
agreements unenforceable .... "); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1987)
(preempting state law that prohibited arbitration of claims arising under the California
Labor Code); Keating, 465 U.S. at 16 (preempting state law that prohibited arbitration
of California Franchise Investment Law claims).
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The FAA does not protect unconscionable agreements to arbitrate
and no court has ever compelled arbitration in the face of a finding of
unconscionability, as that term is defined in a given jurisdiction.20 9
Therefore, unless a court was to find that the Secretary's finding of
unconscionability was really a pretext 210 for general hostility to arbi-
tration-something clearly not permitted by the FAA-then a reviewing
court should give the Secretary due deference and uphold the ruling.
Certainly the proposal advanced in this Article is not pretextual,
and it does not advocate that HHS endorse some public policy against
arbitration. Instead, this proposal goes straight to the heart of the
FAA's insistence that unconscionable agreements to arbitrate cannot
be enforced. As discussed previously, the lack of bargaining power,
the advanced age of nursing home residents, their poor mental and
physical health, and all of the other circumstances surrounding entry
to a nursing home demonstrate that there is a legitimate basis, deeply
rooted in the law of unconscionability, that supports a decision to
declare pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements unconscionable in
nursing home admission contracts.21 Thus, the FAA should not pre-
empt this action.
IV. FINDING PRE-DISPUTE BINDING ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN
NURSING HOME ADMISSION CONTRACTS UNCONSCIONABLE Is
CONSISTENT WITH CONGRESS'S PAST EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE ELDERLY
If the Secretary prohibits pre-dispute binding arbitration agree-
ments for nursing homes receiving federal funds, it would hardly be
the first governmental foray into regulating the affairs of the nursing
home industry. In 1987, the federal government drastically changed
the requirements by which nursing homes participating in the Medi-
care and Medicaid programs had to abide in order to receive federal
funds.21 2 Equally drastic were the changes to the way the government
oversaw these providers.21 3 On December 22, 1987, the Omnibus
209. "Generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without
contravening" the FAA. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687.
210. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1001, 1016 (1996).
211. See supra Part I.
212. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Health Care Financing Research and
Demonstration Cooperative Agreements and Grants; Amendment, 51 Fed. Reg.
36,856-02 (Oct. 16, 1986).
213. Id.
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Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA '87) was enacted.214 Part of
OBRA '87, the Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA), 215 amended the
Social Security Act and provided for a new survey and enforcement
process, which allowed state and federal agencies to cooperatively
enforce a new and expansive set of health and safety regulations for
nursing homes.21 6 Prior to the NHRA, nursing homes were subject to
only fifteen statutory requirements in order to be eligible for Medicare
participation, 217 and the remedies available for non-compliance were
extremely limited.218 Moreover, the focus of the pre-NHRA require-
ments was not on the quality of care being given by the facilities.219
After the passage of the NHRA, nursing homes became subject to more
than 100 statutory requirements, many related to quality of care,
which had to be substantially complied with in order to participate in
Medicare and Medicaid programs.22 °
The NHRA is striking in both its breadth and specificity. It states
that facilities "must care for [their] residents in such a manner and in
such an environment as will promote maintenance or enhancement of
the quality of life of each resident."'22' To facilitate this broad directive,
the statute imposes very specific care-related requirements on nursing
homes. The statute requires facilities to maintain a quality "assess-
ment and assurance committee" that meets at least quarterly, and it
requires the committee to be comprised of the director of nursing, a
physician, and at least 3 other staff members.222 The statute requires
facilities to assess residents upon admission, quarterly, and at any
time the resident has experienced a significant change in his or her
214. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4101, 101
Stat. 1330, 1330-1400.
215. Nursing Home Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b)(4), 1396r(b)(4) (2000).
216. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Survey, Certification and Enforcement of
Skilled Nursing Facilities and Nursing Facilities, 57 Fed. Reg. 39,278-01 (proposed
Aug. 28, 1992) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 442, 488-89).
217. Id.
218. Prior to OBRA '87, the only sanctions provided for by statute for
noncompliance with requirements for participation were "termination, nonrenewal, or
automatic cancellation of provider agreements; denial of participation for prospective
facilities; and denial of payment for new admissions in lieu of termination when the
facilities . . . did not pose an immediate and serious threat to the health and safety of
residents." Id.
219. INST. OF MED., IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONG-TERM CARE 5 (Gooloo S.
Wunderlich & Peter 0. Kohler eds., 2001).
220. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Survey, Certification and Enforcement of
Skilled Nursing Facilities and Nursing Facilities, 57 Fed. Reg. 39,278-01.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b)(1)(A) (2000).
222. Id. § 1396r(b)(1)(B).
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physical or mental condition.223 The statutory requirements for the
assessment are very detailed. Nursing homes receiving federal funds
must
conduct a comprehensive, accurate, standardized, reproducible assess-
ment of each resident's functional capacity, which assessment-
(i) describes the resident's capability to perform daily life func-
tions and significant impairments in functional capacity;
(ii) is based on a uniform minimum data set specified by the
Secretary under subsection (f)(6)(A) of this section;
(iii) uses an instrument which is specified by the State under
subsection (e)(5) of this section; and
(iv) includes the identification of medical problems.224
The NHRA also requires that facilities have a very detailed written
plan of care for each resident. That statute requires nursing homes to:
provide services and activities to attain or maintain the highest practi-
cable physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being of each resident in
accordance with a written plan of care which-
(A) describes the medical, nursing, and psychosocial needs of
the resident and how such needs will be met;
(B) is initially prepared, with the participation to the extent prac-
ticable of the resident or the resident's family or legal repre-
sentative, by a team which includes the resident's attending
physician and a registered professional nurse with responsi-
bility for the resident; and
(C) is periodically reviewed and revised by such team after each
assessment under paragraph (3).22
The NHRA also requires nursing homes to provide a plethora of
services to meet the needs of the resident as identified in the compre-
hensive plan of care. Nursing homes must provide necessary rehabili-
tative services, social services, pharmaceutical services, dietary
services, an activities program, routine and emergency dental services,
and treatments required for the mentally ill and mentally retarded.226
One of the most impressive aspects of the NHRA is that it provides
not only a comprehensive list of duties for nursing homes, but it also
provides nursing home residents with an extensive list of rights.
2 2 7
Nursing homes must promote and protect each resident's right to free
228 229 230choice, 8 right to the freedom from restraints, privacy, confiden-
223. Id. § 1396r(b)(3)(C)(i)-(ii).
224. Id. § 1396r(b)(3)(A).
225. Id. § 1396r(b)(2).
226. Id. § 1396r(b)(4)(A).
227. Id. § 1396r(c)(1).
228. Id. § 1396r(c)(1)(A)(i). The right to free choice is described as:
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tiality,23  right to the accommodation of needs, 232 right to air griev-
ances,233 right to participate in resident and family groups,234 right to
The right to choose a personal attending physician, to be fully informed in
advance about care and treatment, to be fully informed in advance of any
changes in care or treatment that may affect the resident's well-being, and
(except with respect to a resident adjudged incompetent) to participate in
planning care and treatment or changes in care and treatment.
Id.
229. Id. § 1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii). The right to be free from restraints is described as:
The right to be free from physical or mental abuse, corporal punishment,
involuntary seclusion, and any physical or chemical restraints imposed for
purposes of discipline or convenience and not required to treat the resident's
medical symptoms. Restraints may only be imposed-
(I) to ensure the physical safety of the resident or other residents, and
(II) only upon the written order of a physician that specifies the
duration and circumstances under which the restraints are to be
used (except in emergency circumstances specified by the Secretary
until such an order could reasonably be obtained).
Id.
230. Id. § 1396r(c)(1)(A)(iii). The right to privacy is described as: "The right to
privacy with regard to accommodations, medical treatment, written and telephonic
communications, visits, and meetings of family and of resident groups." Id. The right
to privacy does not require the facility to provide a private room. Id.
231. Id. § 1396r(c)(1)(A)(iv). The right of confidentiality is described as: "The
right to confidentiality of personal and clinical records and to access current clinical
records of the resident upon request by the resident or the resident's legal
representative, within 24 hours (excluding hours occurring during a weekend or
holiday) after making such a request." Id.
232. Id. § 1396r(c)(1)(A)(v). The right to accommodation of needs is described as:
The right-
(I) to reside and receive services with reasonable accommodation of
individual needs and preferences, except where the health or safety
of the individual or other residents would be endangered, and
(11) to receive notice before the room or roommate of the resident in the
facility is changed.
Id.
233. Id. § 1396r(c)(1)(A)(vi). The right to air grievances is described as:
The right to voice grievances with respect to treatment or care that is (or fails
to be) furnished, without discrimination or reprisal for voicing the grievances
and the right to prompt efforts by the facility to resolve grievances the
resident may have, including those with respect to the behavior of other
residents.
Id.
234. Id. § 1395i-3(c)(1)(A)(vii). The right to participate in resident and family
groups is described as: "The right of the resident to organize and participate in
resident groups in the facility and the right of the resident's family to meet in the
facility with the families of other residents in the facility." Id.
200
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2323participate in other activities, ' right to examine survey results,236
and right to refuse certain transfers.237
The enforcement system also changed dramatically. The enforce-
ment of federal regulations governing nursing homes is done through
a partnership between state survey agencies and Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS). 238 Under OBRA '87, facilities must be
surveyed at least once every 15 months.239 Surveys are performed by
multi-disciplinary teams of CMS-trained and certified health profes-
sionals.240 All survey teams must have at least one registered nurse.24'
Survey teams investigate whether facilities are in substantial compli-
ance with program requirements.242 The surveyors review facility and
resident records, interview staff, residents, and family members, and
observe care directly.2 43 The purpose of these surveys is to genuinely
assess the quality of the care the nursing home residents are receiving,
rather than the very limited "paper" review that was conducted prior to
the enactment of OBRA '87.244
Also, the NHRA greatly expanded the type of sanctions that the
government may impose for regulatory violations so that the govern-
ment can exert more pressure on facilities to attain compliance
235. Id. § 1395i-3(c)(1)(A)(viii). The right to participate in other activities is
described as: "The right of the resident to participate in social, religious, and
community activities that do not interfere with the rights of other residents in the
facility." Id.
236. Id. § 1395i-3(c)(1)(A)(ix). The right to examine survey results is described as:
"The right to examine, upon reasonable request, the results of the most recent survey
of the facility conducted by the Secretary or a State with respect to the facility and any
plan of correction in effect with respect to the facility." Id.
237. Id. § 1395i-3(c)(1)(A)(x). The right to refuse certain transfers is described as:
The right to refuse a transfer to another room within the facility, if a purpose
of the transfer is to relocate the resident from a portion of the facility that is a
skilled nursing facility (for purposes of this subchapter) to a portion of the
facility that is not such a skilled nursing facility.
Id.
238. Robert Fabrikant & Glenn E. Solomon, Application of the Federal False Claims
Act to Regulatory Compliance Issues in the Health Care Industry, 51 ALA. L. REv. 105,
118 (1999); see also Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Survey, Certification and
Enforcement of Skilled Nursing Facilities and Nursing Facilities, 57 Fed. Reg. 39,278-
01 (proposed Aug. 28, 1992) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 442, 488-89).
239. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(g)(2)(A)(iii)(I).
240. Id. § 1396r(g)(2)(E)(i).
241. Id.
242. Id. § 1396r(h)(4).
243. 42 C.F.R § 488.110 (2007).
244. Id.
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quickly. 245 Before the passage of OBRA '87, the only sanctions that the
Secretary imposed were termination from participation in the Medi-
care and Medicaid programs (which was very rare) and in limited cir-
cumstances denial of payment (from Medicare and Medicaid) for new
admissions.246 After the passage of OBRA '87, the government was
authorized to impose civil money penalties of anywhere between $50
and $10,000 per day, or up to $10,000 per instance, for facilities fail-
ing to maintain substantial compliance with federal regulations.247
The per day penalties in particular were intended to provide the facili-
ties with an incentive to address problems identified in a survey
quickly or face the prospect of mounting fines.248 OBRA '87 also
authorized the appointment of a substitute manager by the state sur-
vey agency, 249 empowered the Secretary to direct facilities to provide
in-service training of staff regarding deficient areas identified during a
survey, 25° and directed facilities to develop plans of correction for
cited deficiencies. 25' The statute also allowed for the placement of a
state monitor in the nursing facility 25 2 and the transfer of residents
and closure of the facility.253
It is difficult to overstate the degree to which the character of fed-
eral and state oversight of long-term care facilities changed with the
passage of OBRA '87. In a very real sense, the federal government has
dictated to nursing home operators how they must run their business
if they want access to federal taxpayer dollars.254 The magnitude of
these changes can be seen in the response to the regulations imple-
menting the statute. On August 28, 1992, the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA)-which was subsequently renamed CMS in
2003255 -issued a proposed rule implementing the statutory require-
245. Jennifer Gimler Brady, Long-Term Care Under Fire: A Case for Rational
Enforcement, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 16 (2001); see also COMM. ON
NURSING HOME REGULATION, INST. OF MED., IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING
HOMES 241 (1986).
246. Brady, supra note 245, at 15.
247. 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.406(a)(3), .408.
248. Brady, supra note 245, at 16.
249. 42 C.F.R. § 488.406(a)(1).
250. Id. § 488.406(a)(8).
251. Id. § 488.406(a)(7).
252. Id. § 488.406(a)(4).
253. Id. § 488.406(a)(5)-(6).
254. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r (2000).
255. Medicare Perscription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 900(e), 117 Stat. 2066, 2370-74 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 10, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).
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ments of the NHRA.2 6 HCFA received more than 27,000 letters in
response to the proposed regulations.257 HCFA also made the effective
date of the rule approximately eight months after publication in the
Federal Register, rather than the normal thirty to sixty day period. 258
The purpose of reviewing this extraordinary legislation is to
expose the degree to which Congress felt it was necessary to regulate
the nursing home industry to protect our nation's elderly. Congress
clearly believed that this industry must be very closely regulated in
order to protect senior citizens who need nursing home placement.259
A decision by the Secretary to prohibit pre-dispute binding arbitration
agreements because they likely have an adverse effect on care, is
entirely consistent with the expansive reach of the NHRA.26 °
V. THE SECRETARY SHOULD USE His OR HER AUTHORITY TO PROHIBIT
NURSING HOMES FROM INCLUDING BINDING ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS IN ADMISSION CONTRACTS
A. Nursing Home Residents Would Benefit from Prohibiting Binding
Arbitration Agreements in Nursing Home Admission Contracts
While it is certainly worthwhile to note how prohibiting pre-dis-
pute binding arbitration agreements would be consistent with the
goals of the NHRA, it is also important to focus on the fact that prohib-
iting these agreements would help nursing home residents. Case law
and the published literature suggest that it is not uncommon for bind-
ing arbitration agreements to be presented on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis, 26 1 forbid any meaningful judicial review of the arbitrator's deci-
256. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Survey, Certification and Enforcement of
Skilled Nursing Facilities and Nursing Facilities, 57 Fed. Reg. 39,278-01 (proposed
Aug. 28, 1992) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 442, 488-89).
257. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Survey, Certification and Enforcement of
Skilled Nursing Facilities and Nursing Facilities, 59 Fed. Reg. 56,116-01, 56,127-01
(proposed Nov. 10, 1994) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 401, 431, 435, 440-42, 447,
483, 488-89, 498).
258. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Survey, Certification and Enforcement of
Skilled Nursing Facilities and Nursing Facilities, 57 Fed. Reg. 39,278-01.
259. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r.
260. Id.
261. Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507, 520 (Miss. 2005) ("The
contract at issue was drafted unilaterally by the dominant party and then presented on
a 'take it or leave it' basis to the weaker party who had no real opportunity to bargain
about its terms. As stated by the circuit judge, the evidence before the court
established that 'had Mr. Taylor not signed the admissions agreement, he would not
have been accepted into the nursing home."'); Raiteri ex rel. Cox v. NHC Healthcare/
Knoxville, Inc., No. E2003-00068-COA-R9-CV, 2003 WL 23094413, at *2 (Tenn. Ct.
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262 21264sion, impose caps on damages,263 limit discovery, require confi-
App. Dec. 30, 2003) ("The admissions coordinator confirmed that Mrs. Cox would not
have been admitted if Mr. Cox had refused to sign the admission agreement or had
refused to assent to the terms of the dispute resolution procedures in the agreement,
which provisions included one waiving Mrs. Cox's right to a jury trial.").
262. Arbitration agreements often contain language limiting judicial review of
arbitrators' decisions. The FAA also precludes any meaningful review. Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) ("[Clourts may overturn
arbitration decisions '[w]here there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators."' (quoting the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1988))); Sec. &
Inv. Planning Co. v. J.P.C. Contracting Co., No. 231/04, 2004 WL 2715323, at *4
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 7, 2004) (forbidding judicial review of arbitrator's decision); J.
Maria Grover, Become Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1735, 1743 (2006) ("Other procedural
aspects of mandatory arbitration have also generated criticism. For example,
arbitration does not typically provide a right to appeal, and review of arbitral awards
by courts is limited under the FAA to grounds of corruption, fraud, 'evident partiality,'
misconduct, and actions that are ultra vires."); Katherine A. Helm, The Expanding
Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Where Does the Buck Stop?, 61 Disp.
RESOL. J. 16, 18 (2006) ("Section 10(a) of the FAA vests courts with jurisdiction to
review an arbitration award only where the process has been 'tainted in certain
specific ways.' This provision is the source of authority for most judicial review of
arbitration awards." (quoting Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir.
1990))). According to 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000), a court may vacate an arbitration
award only in the following circumstances:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them;
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
Id.
263. Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber, 988 So. 2d 910, 922 (Miss. Ct. App.
2007) (striking from an admissions agreement "a limitation on the amount of damages
that may be recovered in a dispute between the nursing home and the resident or
responsible party").
264. Prieto v. Healthcare & Ret. Corp. of Am., 919 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2005) (reversing an order compelling arbitration based on admission agreement
that included limitations on discovery).
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dentiality, 265 and not require the arbitrator to articulate the bases for
the decision in writing.2 66 The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that
the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judi-
cial factfinding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not as
complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and pro-
cedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process,
cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often severely lim-
ited or unavailable. 2
67
Many binding arbitration agreements also require the resident to
have his or her claim decided by an arbitrator selected from a pool of
former nursing home industry lawyers.2 68 Thus, instead of a jury of
twelve citizens, or an impartial judge, the nursing home resident will
have his or her claim decided by someone who has likely been an
agent for nursing facilities in the past.
269
While it is usually true that the terms in an arbitration agreement
apply equally to both sides, nursing home residents are still prejudiced
by these agreements. 270 The reason for this centers on the types of
cases nursing homes bring against residents compared to the types of
cases residents bring against nursing homes.
271
Nursing homes typically sue for nonpayment. 272 Residents typi-
cally sue for neglect, abuse, or negligent care.273 The stakes are, there-
fore, much higher for the resident because damages associated with a
resident's tort-like claims are going to be much higher than damages
265. Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1369, 1378-79 (11th Cir. 2005)
(analyzing an arbitration clause that required confidentiality in a class action suit).
266. Buchignani v. Vining-Sparks IBG, No. 98-6692, 2000 WL 263344, at *1 (6th
Cir. Mar. 2, 2000) (discussing arbitration decision that did "not provide findings of
fact or conclusions of law, nor did it otherwise state any specific bases for its
decision").
267. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1974) (citing Bernhardt
v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956)); accord Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,
435-37 (1953); see also United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 598 (1960) ("Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for
an award.").
268. Krasuski, supra note 9, at 269 ("Nursing homes frequently select the American
Health Lawyers Association ([the] AHLA) as their arbitration provider, a practice
criticized by resident advocates, who claim that the AHLA consists of lawyers who
typically represent health care providers and thus are more likely to rule in favor of
nursing homes.").
269. Id.
270. Id. at 268-69.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 269.
273. Id.
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associated with the nursing home's breach of contract action. Assum-
ing that arbitration typically results in a lower dollar award than a jury
trial,2 74 an adverse ruling from an arbitrator could result in a loss in
the millions of dollars to the resident, while an adverse ruling in a
breach of contract action brought by the nursing home would certainly
be a small fraction of that.
Caps on damages also appear to be fair because they apply to both
parties. However, for the same reasons discussed above, a damages
cap would only serve to reduce an award for a resident but would not
similarly limit the nursing home's chance of recovery in a suit against
a resident. Limits on discovery would also be likely to disproportion-
ately harm residents because the nursing home controls virtually all
the information that would be relevant to a resident's tort-like claim.
Arbitration can also be more costly than traditional litigation for
nursing home residents. Filing a case in a state or federal court costs a
few hundred dollars.275 There is no cost for the judge hearing the case
because our public courts are taxpayer financed. In contrast, arbitra-
tion services like the American Arbitration Association, the National
Arbitration Forum, the American Health Lawyers, etc., charge
thousands of dollars to handle complex medical cases.276 These costs
are independent of the arbitrators' fees, which are frequently
thousands of dollars for these types of cases.2 77
Nursing home residents are also likely to get a substantially lower
recovery from arbitrators than they would a jury. A 2000 study of Kai-
ser Permanente's arbitration system in California revealed that Kaiser
arbitrators' median medical malpractice awards were $102,740,
whereas jury verdict median awards were between $200,000 and
$500,000, depending on the data source analyzed.278
A comparison of a hypothetical arbitration award and jury award
illustrates how disadvantaged nursing home residents can be by arbi-
tration. Assuming a median award of $102,740, a nursing home resi-
dent who had to pay a one-third contingency fee ($ 33,904) to his or
her lawyer, expert witness fees of $10,000, and half the arbitration
forum and arbitrators" fees ($10,000 total, so resident pays $5,000)
would recover just $53,836. Using the $200,000 median jury award
274. Id. at 267 (citing Alan Bloom et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution in Health
Care, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 61 (1995)).
275. PUB. CITIZEN'S CONG. WATCH, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION 42 (2002), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF110A.PDF.
276. Budnitz, supra note 8, at 136-37.
277. PUB. CITIZEN'S CONG. WATCH, supra note 275, at 44-45.
278. Id. at 68.
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figure and a thirty-three percent contingency fee, plus $10,000 in
expert witness fees, that same resident would recover $124,000.
The Kaiser data are supported by a recent study that illustrates
that arbitration is substantially cutting the cost of medical malpractice
claims for nursing homes. 2 79 According to a study by the Aon Global
Risk Consulting, the cost per claim for medical malpractice in nursing
homes declined from over $200,000 per claim to under $150,000 per
claim from 2000 to 2006.28°
In addition to these reasons, there is something heavy-handed
about forcing a frail, elderly person to sign away access to the civil
justice system as a condition of being allowed to live in a nursing
home. It is exploitive to make such a demand of people who in many
ways are at their physically (and perhaps mentally) weakest point in
life and enduring the emotional turmoil that surrounds admission to a
nursing home. Such a requirement is inconsistent with the life and
dignity affirmed by federal nursing home reform laws.28'
B. The Public Would Benefit if the Secretary Prohibited Nursing
Homes from Including Binding Arbitration Agreements in
Admission Contracts
There are broader public policy concerns that should also be
taken into account. Health care is provided to nursing home residents
through an interrelated public/private system where the government
serves primarily as the party paying for the services, and private actors
are primarily responsible for delivering the services.282 The provision
of care in a nursing home context is governed by the statutory require-
279. Posting of Jacob Goldstein to Health Blog-WSJ, http://blogs.wsj.com/health/
2008/04/11/nursing-homes-push-arbitration-reduce-lawsuits/?mod=WSJBlog (Apr.
11, 2008, 13:27 EST).
280. Id. Of course industry supporters view diminished recovery for claims as an
indication that arbitration is working, not that it is functioning improperly.
281. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 483.25 (2005).
282. The nursing home regulatory framework is indicative of the modern regulatory
state, which is increasingly dominated by arrangements where public and private
entities jointly perform administrative functions. See Jody Freeman, Private Parties,
Public Functions, and the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 816 (2000).
This point was articulated very well by Professor Jeffrey S. Lubbers:
Of course there is something else going on in our regulatory state that
Professor Freeman recognizes. The federal government workforce is
shrinking. It is at the lowest level since the Eisenhower Administration. But
the demands of the modern regulatory state are not shrinking; in fact they
are growing. This requires alternative techniques for achieving regulatory
goals. One way is for the government to depend more on the so-called
"shadow government" -the world of government contractors.
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ments of the NHRA,283 the regulations implementing the NHRA, 28 4
and the requirements of state law.2s5 The statutory and regulatory
framework in which nursing home care occurs is one of the most elab-
orate ever devised.286 Despite the existence of such an elaborate regu-
latory system, nurses, nurse aides, physicians, administrators, and
many others exercise a tremendous amount of discretion in providing
this care.
Care of the elderly is custodial, long-term, and encompasses every
conceivable aspect of living.287 Many elderly people cannot attend to
the activities of daily living (putting on clothes, brushing teeth, comb-
ing hair); many are incontinent of bowel, bladder, or both; and many
lack the mental capacity to make even the simplest decisions (what to
eat, what to wear) on their own.288 Consequently, the degree to which
private parties such as nursing home staff and administration exercise
control and discretion over the care of government beneficiaries is
remarkable.
Clearly, contracting out this kind of care to private entities is a
delegation of power from the governmental agency responsible for
ensuring that beneficiaries receive quality care to entities in the private
sector that have no accountability to the electorate and that operate, for
the most part, for profit.2 89 Traditionally, administrative law scholar-
ship has ignored the role that private actors play in governance, and
focused instead on the legitimacy of agency authority and the role of
the judiciary in reviewing agency action.29 ° To the extent that admin-
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Approaches to Regulatory Reform in the United States: A Response to
the Remarks of Professors Levin and Freeman, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1893, 1902 (2005).
283. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r (2000).
284. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 483.25.
285. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131-D2 (2007).
286. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 483.25.
287. Maureen Armour, A Nursing Home's Good Faith Duty "to" Care: Redefining a
Fragile Relationship Using the Law of Contract, 39 ST. Louis U. LJ. 217, 228 (1994).
288. See KASPER & O'MALLEY, supra note 126, at 9.
289. See Shin-Yi Chou, Asymmetric Information, Ownership and Quality of Care: An
Empirical Analysis of Nursing Homes, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 293, 294 (2002) (discussing
study that found non-profit nursing homes provide better care than for-profit nursing
homes).
290. Professor Freeman uses the term "legitimacy" to encompass several complaints
about administrative power, including agencies' lack of direct political accountability
and incompatibility with separation of law principles. Further, she notes that the
concern about legitimacy also takes the form of administrative law scholars' calls for
the elimination of certain agencies, "revival of the nondelegation doctrine," and
debates over the proper standard of judicial review of agency action. Jody Freeman,
The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 555-57 (2000).
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istrative law scholars have focused on the private role in governance,
their response has been to view private actors as dangerous.291
Recognizing the apparent permanence and pervasiveness of pub-
lic/private partnerships, administrative law scholars, led by Professor
Jody Freeman, are beginning to explore these relationships in a differ-
ent light.292 In this new mode of analysis, administrative law should
focus not on the purely public versus the purely private realm (for
those distinctions are illusory), but should instead focus on the critical
unit of observation in administrative law-"the set of negotiated rela-
tionships between the public and the private. ' '29 3 This presents real
opportunity: It allows administrative law to conceive of alternative
accountability mechanisms that might facilitate private entities' pro-
motion of public goals while still retaining the flexibility to achieve
desired outcomes efficiently.294
One alternative means of promoting accountability is through
contract.295 Agencies can insist on terms in contracts with private
agencies that promote democratic ideals such as accountability, due
process, rationality, and equality in exchange for contracting out the
work.296 In this scenario, privatization would not result in a loss of
public values, as critics of privatization fear, but could lead to their
expansion among private sector operators.297 Agencies can also use
their rule-making power to ensure that privatization does not result in
the loss of public values.
This analysis has particular force in the nursing home context.
The fact that private parties exercise so much control over Medicare
and Medicaid beneficiaries is an inevitable consequence of the manner
in which government-subsidized care is structured. So long as the
majority of health care providers are private entities, the government's
291. Id. at 558.
292. "The traditional emphasis on agency action and the theoretical defensiveness
toward private activity make it difficult for administrative law to explore how
administration really works." Id. at 564. Thus, according to Professor Freeman,
"[a]dministrative law, a field motivated by the need to legitimize the exercise of
governmental authority, must now reckon with private power, or risk irrelevance as a
discipline." Id. at 545.
293. Id. at 548.
294. Id. at 549.
295. Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARv. L.
REv. 1285, 1285 (2003).
296. Id.
297. Professor Freeman describes this as "publicization," meaning a process
"through which private actors increasingly commit themselves to traditionally public
goals as the price of access to lucrative opportunities to deliver goods and services that
might otherwise be provided directly by the state." Id.
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ability to directly oversee the care provided by those private entities is
limited. Therefore, government must utilize other methods to ensure
accountability for the private actors who exercise so much discretion
over the care of beneficiaries.
The survey and enforcement system is the principle means by
which the government exercises oversight in this arena. There is abun-
dant data indicating that the survey and enforcement process has yet
to be an effective method of ensuring that private actors are providing
the quality of care necessary to meet the congressional mandate that
nursing home residents receive the care necessary to attain and main-
tain their "highest practicable physical, mental and psychosocial well-
being. 2
98
Against this backdrop of federal and state ineffectiveness, the resi-
dent's ability to seek redress for harm caused by poor care becomes all
the more pressing. Because the nursing home staff and administration
are not considered state actors, residents cannot avail themselves of
constitutional due process protections based on failure to provide qual-
ity care as required by the NHRA. 299 This situation generally leaves
residents with state common law and statutory causes of action.
In the absence of an arbitration agreement, nursing home
residents can bring a civil suit in the public court system. This public
exposure is critical to accountability. It allows members of the local
community to keep track of what is happening in nursing homes in
their community.
Access to courts also allows nursing home advocates the opportu-
nity to collect valuable information about how nursing home residents
are being treated. In 2006, the National Citizens' Coalition for Nursing
Home Reform (NCCNHR) published The Faces of Neglect: Behind the
298. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOME QUALITY: PREVALENCE OF SERIOUS
PROBLEMS, WHILE DECLINING, REINFORCES IMPORTANCE OF ENHANCED OVERSIGHT, S. Doc.
No. GAO-03-561, at 46 n.56 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03561.pdf; see also KATHRYN G. ALLEN, U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NURSING HOME REFORM: CONTINUED ATTENTION Is NEEDED TO
IMPROVE QUALITY OF CARE IN SMALL BUT SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF HOMES, S. Doc. No. GAO-
07-794T (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07794t.pdf; U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NURSING HOMES: DESPITE INCREASED OVERSIGHT, CHALLENGES
REMAIN IN ENSURING HIGH-QUALITY CARE AND RESIDENT SAFETY, S. Doc. No. GAO-06-117
(2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06117.pdf.
299. "State actors are subject to the full panoply of congressional, executive and
judicial oversight mechanisms. They must comply with all constitutional
requirements, including procedural due process, and unless Congress provides
otherwise, the procedural demands of the APA. Private actors, by contrast, remain
relatively unregulated by procedural norms ...." Freeman, supra note 274, at 842-43
(footnote omitted).
54
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol31/iss2/1
A SENIOR MOMENT
Closed Doors of Nursing Homes. 30 0 This publication documented terri-
ble incidents of abuse and neglect of thirty-six nursing home residents
in ten states.3 0 ' NCCNHR was only able to put these case studies
together because these cases had been litigated in the public court sys-
tem.3 ° 2 NCCNHR used this book to lobby Congress on behalf of nurs-
ing home residents.30 3 On April 28, 2006, Representative Henry
Waxman, who sponsored the Nursing Home Staffing Act of 2005,304
drafted and disseminated a letter that urged his House colleagues to
read the NCCNHR publication and to support this legislation.30 5
Keeping nursing home cases in the public domain allots the pub-
lic and advocates an ability to assess whether the partnership between
CMS and the nursing home industry is achieving the results
demanded by the public. It helps hold the nursing home industry
accountable.
If private suits are required to be arbitrated, there is virtually no
public forum in which nursing home cases will be litigated.30 6 This
lack of transparency is worsened because federal hearings resulting
from long-term care enforcement actions are not open to the public. It
seems fundamentally inconsistent with democratic values to have liti-
gation about care that is publicly funded be held in secret. For these
reasons, the Secretary can and should prohibit the inclusion of bind-
ing arbitration agreements in long-term care admission contracts of
providers receiving federal funds.30 7
CONCLUSION
The nursing home context deserves different treatment from other
consumer transactions because it is so different. There are very few, if
300. NAT'L CITIZENS' COAL. FOR NURSING HOME REFORM, THE FACES OF NEGLECT:
BEHIND THE CLOSED DOORS OF NURSING HOMES (2006).
301. Memorandum from NCCNHR to the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin.
Law, Comm. on the Judiciary 2 (June 12, 2007), available at http://www.nccnhr.org/
uploads/NCCNHRStatementforJune12HearingonArbitration.pdf.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 3.
304. Nursing Home Staffing Act of 2005, H.R. 4293, 109th Cong.
305. Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Congressman, House of Representatives, to
Comm. on Gov't Reform (Apr. 28, 2006), available at http://www.nccnhr.org/
uploads/WaxmancolleagueLtr.pdf.
306. State agencies can hold public hearings when revoking a nursing home's state
license. However, such licensure revocation actions are exceedingly rare. See, e.g., W.
Andrew Arnold & Brian E. Arnold, Helping Society's Most Vulnerable: Nursing Home
Litigation, 14 S.C. LAW., Mar. 2003, at 28.
307. The APA does not apply to agency contracts. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2000).
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any, "consumer" transactions that remotely resemble nursing home
placement in terms of loss of privacy, autonomy, and vulnerability.
These factors expose nursing home residents to an extraordinary array
of harms. In his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Ken
Conner described the conditions many nursing home residents
endure:
All too often, the story is the same: avoidable pressure ulcers (bed
sores) penetrating to the bone; wounds with dirty bandages that are
infected and foul smelling; patients languishing in urine and feces for
hours on end; hollow-eyed residents suffering from avoidable malnu-
trition, unable to ask for help because their tongues are parched and
swollen from preventable, dehydration; dirty catheters clogged with
crystalline sediment and yellow-green urine in the bag; residents who
are victims of sexual and physical abuse from caregivers; [and] short-
handed staff . . . harried and overworked because their employers
decided to increase profits by decreasing labor costs ... 308
Sometimes society is better served through certain "overbroad
prophylactic rules" than "case-by-case adjudication after the fact."30 9
This is one of those cases. The fact that this prohibition may reach too
far in impeding the freedom to contract-in the sense that it will pro-
hibit binding arbitration under circumstances where the risk of proce-
dural unconscionability is very 1ow 3 1 0 -is of less compelling concern
in this context. Nursing home operators enter into this business with
the full knowledge that it is a heavily federally funded and regulated
industry. In fact, the large government subsidy most certainly attracts
many operators into the businesses. Thus, there is the expectation
that the government will impose restrictions on many aspects of the
manner in which business is conducted-including restrictions on the
terms that nursing home operators can impose on nursing home
residents in their admission contracts.311
308. House Hearing, supra note 14 (testimony of Kenneth L. Connor), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Connor080610.pdf.
309. Epstein, supra note 59, at 795 ("I am quite happy to recognize-indeed, to insist
upon-limitations of freedom of contract[,] [such as the Statute of Frauds,] that take
into account the vulnerable status of certain groups (infants, insane people, some
elderly) ....").
310. Imagine a lucid corporate lawyer who enters a nursing home and actively
bargains with the nursing home operators because he or she has a choice of quality
nursing homes available to him or her that do not require binding arbitration.
311. Medicare and Medicaid prohibit facilities from requiring "a third party
guarantee of payment to the facility as a condition of admission (or expedited
admission) to, or continued stay in, the facility." 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(c)(5)(A)(ii),
1396r(c)(5)(A)(ii) (2000).
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Would it be better if Congress were to act to prohibit these agree-
ments? Certainly it would, and with any luck Congress may eventu-
ally do that. But it is important to remember that Congress has
already acted. Congress passed the Medicare and Medicaid statutes
and gave the Secretary the power to protect nursing home residents by
prohibiting pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements. The Secretary
should use the power Congress provided.
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